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Congress's Power to Block Enforcement
of Federal Court Orders
JenniferMason McAward*
ABSTRACT: This Article considers the constitutionality and propriety of
recent appropriations riders passed by the House of Representatives in
response to controversialfederal court rulings. The ridersprohibit the use of
any federal funds for the enforcement of court orders issued in specified
cases. These enforcement-blocking provisions raise significant separation-ofpowers concerns as between Congress and both coordinate branches of the
federal government.
This Article begins by considering both the controversial First Amendment
rulings that triggeredthe enforcement-blocking riders and the potential effect
of the riders-namely, to prevent the U.S. Marshals Service from taking any
enforcement action against noncompliant parties. Next, this Article
considers the substantialseparation-of-powers implications of the riders by
examining the scope of Congress's power over appropriations,the nature of
the Article III 'judicial Power," and the Executive's responsibility for
enforcingfinal court orders. Congress may not exercise its appropriations
power in a manner that encroaches on the core functions of the coordinate
branches of the federal government. However, enforcement-blocking
provisions tread close to the heart of the Article III duty to issue final,
executable orders. Moreover, they impinge on the Executive's duty or
prerogative to enforce final court orders. The implications of Congress's
broad conception of its appropriations power and of its power of
independent constitutional interpretation could have sweeping and
untenable consequences. Thus, this Article concludes that Congress is
constitutionally barredfrom selectively de-funding executive enforcement of
finalfederal court orders.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School; J.D., New York
University School of Law, 1998; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1994. Thank you to the
participants of the 2007 Jurisgenesis Conference hosted by Washington University School of
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Devins, Kristine Lucius, John Nagle, Bob Rodes, and Julian Velasco for their comments and
encouragement, and to my research assistants Francis Budde, TJ Pillari, Vad Uman, and Chris
Upton for their excellent work.
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INTRODUCTION

During the Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Justice Samuel
Alito, Senator Patrick Leahy asked then-Judge Alito to opine on the
constitutionality of a congressional appropriations bill that would bar the
use of federal funds to enforce a particular court decision that reached an
unpopular result on an issue of constitutional law.' Justice Alito responded:
"[T] hat's a provocative constitutional issue that-I don't know the answer to
,,2
it ....

Senator Leahy's question, while provocative, was not hypothetical. Since
2002, the House of Representatives has included in several appropriations
bills provisions that deny the use of any federal funds for the enforcement of
specified federal court orders. These enforcement-blocking provisions,
which have passed by significant margins in the House only to be stripped
from the final legislation, are an increasingly popular and potentially potent
tool in the arsenal of those who object to controversial court decisions.' By
directly targeting specific court orders, such provisions pose an immediate
challenge to the integrity of the federal courts. By usurping the Executive's
law-enforcement prerogative, such provisions also raise significant
separation-of-powers concerns as between the legislative and executive
branches. While other political efforts to shape and control the federal
judiciary's composition and jurisdiction have been the subject of ongoing
attention, 4 these enforcement-blocking provisions have received virtually no
analysis. Justice Alito was quite right to say that enforcement-blocking
provisions present provocative constitutional issues. This Article represents a

1.
See Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.to be an AssociateJustice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 583
(2006) (question from Sen. Patrick Leahy).
2.
Id. (statement of then-Judge Samuel Alito).
3.
Indeed, on July 26, 2007, the House of Representatives passed, by voice vote, an
appropriations rider preventing the enforcement of two federal criminal judgments and
sentences issued against two Border Patrol agents convicted of shooting an illegal-alien
smuggler. See H.R. 3093, 1l0th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). The bill was included as section 702 of
title VII of the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act before it
was struck. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 3093: Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008, http://www.govtrack.tis/congress/billtext.xpd?
bill=hllO-3093&version=eh (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) (showing the various changes to H.R.
3093). The appropriations rider stated:
None of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used to enforce (1) the
judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in
the case of United States v. Ignacio Ramos, Et A]. (No. EP:05-CR-856-KC) decided
March 8, 2006; and (2) the sentences imposed by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas in the case of United States v. Ignacio Ramos, Et
A]. (No. EP:05-CR-856-KC) on October 19, 2006.
H.R. 3093 § 702.
4.

See infra note 175 (discussing Congress's power to shape the federal judiciary).
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first attempt to assess the constitutional implications of enforcementblocking measures and seeks to provide an analytical framework for future
congressional debates regarding the constitutionality and propriety of such
proposals.
Part II of this Article outlines the factual context of the enforcementblocking provisions, looking at the controversial First Amendment rulings
that triggered Congress's attention and the congressional debates over the
proper way to respond to the rulings.' Part II also considers whether
enforcement-blocking bills are merely symbolic protests or whether they
could, in fact, have a significant effect on the ultimate enforcement of final
court orders. 6
Part III lays the groundwork for an examination of the separation-ofpowers issues that arise from enforcement-blocking provisions. Whether
such provisions interfere with the separation of powers depends on the
delicate interplay between the extent of Congress's power over
appropriations,7 the nature of the Article III "judicial Power,"8 and the
Executive's responsibility for enforcing final court judgments. 9 Part III
therefore considers the scope of the coordinate federal branches' powers
implicated by enforcement-blocking provisions.
Part IV then considers the constitutionality of enforcement-blocking
provisions. From both doctrinal and normative perspectives, it is
inconsistent with the separation of powers for Congress to use its
appropriations power selectively to block the executive branch from
enforcing a federal court order. While such provisions tread close to the
heart of the Article III power, they impinge on the Executive's duty or
prerogative to enforce final court judgments. Even if each coordinate
branch of government should have independent interpretive power vis-a-vis
the Constitution, Congress's broad conception of its own power in this
regard, in conjunction with its broad appropriations power, appears to have
sweeping and untenable consequences.
Accordingly, this Article concludes that, as to cases and controversies
properly before the federal courts, the courts must issue final and
executable orders. The executive branch likely is required to enforce such
orders, at least as to the parties before the court. Finally, Congress is
constitutionally barred from selectively de-funding executive enforcement of
specified judgments. The increasing willingness of a majority in the House
of Representatives to use appropriations riders to block executive

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See
See
See
See
See

infra Part II.A-B.
infra Part II.C.
infra Part III.A.
infra Part III.B.
infra Part III.C.
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enforcement of federal court orders is not only "provocative," but also
unconstitutional.
II.

ENFORCEMENT-BLOCKING PROVISIONS
A.

BACKGROUND

On June 26, 2002, news rippled throughout the country that the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had found unconstitutional the
Pledge of Allegiance's use of the phrase "under God. " ' ° While some
defended the court's decision in Newdow v. United States Congress as a sound
application of governing Supreme Court precedent, many more decried
the court's decision as the product2 of judicial activism and evidence of the
federal courts' hostility to religion.'
Just over a year later, on July 1, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit decided Glassroth v. Moore, holding that the installation and
display of a 2.5-ton granite monument of the Ten Commandments in the
rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.'3 As with the Newdow case, popular
opinion was split on the propriety of the court's decision, with some praising
it as a principled application of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 14 and
others condemning it as further confirmation of the federal courts' hostility
to religion. 15 Indeed, Alabama State Supreme Court ChiefJustice Roy Moore
10. Newdowv. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002).
11.
See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Pledge as Sacred Political Ritual, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 797, 816-17 (2005) ("A powerful argument can be made that the Ninth Circuit got it
right on the Establishment Clause merits.... ."); Rob Boston, One Nation Indivisible?: 'Under God'
Case at Supreme Court Tests Nation's Commitment to Church-State Separation, Religious Pluralism, AMS.
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH & ST., Dec. 2003, http://www.au.org/site/News2?page=

NewsArticle&id=5294&abbr=cs_ ("'[Newdow] shows respect for freedom of conscience.'"
(quoting Americans United for Separation of Church and State Executive Director Barry W.
Lynn's press statement)).
12. See, e.g., David Limbaugh, Kicking God Further Out the Door,WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005,
at A16, available at http://www.davidlimbaugh.com/mt/archives/2005/09/newcolumn_
kick.html (concluding that Newdow highlights "the judicial activism of the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court in their Establishment Clause jurisprudence").
13. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (1lth Cir. 2003). Alabama Chief Justice Roy
Moore ordered the installation of the monument "after the close of business during the
evening of July 31, 2001." Id. at 1286. He did not inform the other justices of his intentions, but
he did invite an evangelical Christian organization to film the monument's installation. Id.
(citation omitted). That same organization sold the video and used part of the raised funds to
underwrite Moore's legal defense. Id. (citation omitted).
14. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1011, 1052 (2005) ("[A]s a matter of constitutional law, the case was easy to decide; former
Chief Justice Moore's behavior erased any doubt that his purpose in erecting the monument
was to promote religion, specifically Christianity.").
15. See, e.g., Vine & Fig Tree, The Unconstitutional and Anti-Christian Decrees of Judge
Myron H. Thompson and His War on "The Rule of Law," http://vftonline.org/EndTheWall/
thompson.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2008) ("Judge Thompson's opinion flies in the face of the
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subsequently refused to obey the Eleventh Circuit's order to remove the
monument. He was suspended as Chief Justice, and the associate justices of
the Alabama Supreme Court ordered the monument removed from public
view on August 21, 2003.16
The dismay over the decisions in Newdow and Glassroth found its way to
the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives in two types of legislative
proposals. First, in response to the Ninth Circuit's refusal to reconsider the
Newdow decision en banc, 7 the House overwhelmingly passed a resolution
"expressing the sense ... that the ruling in Newdow v. United States Congress is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment
and should be overturned."'
In addition to this hortatory resolution, however, the House took a
second, much more interventionist, step: it passed two appropriations riders
designed to block the enforcement of the federal court orders in both
Newdow and Glassroth.'9 The two provisions were the work of Representative
John Hostettler, then a Republican Congressman from southwestern
Indiana.' ° Representative Hostettler introduced the riders as amendments to
a pending appropriations bill for the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
Founding Fathers and the first 150 years of American history under the Constitution. It
represents the arbitrary and tyrannical whim of a man unrestrained by the rule of law.").
16. In re Roy S. Moore, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ala., No. 33, at 3-4 (Ala. Ct.
of the Judiciary Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://fll.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/
docs/religion/inremoorell1303opn.pdf. Moore was removed from office on November 13,
2003 due to ethics violations. Id. at 13.
17. Newdowv. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2003).
18. H.R. Res. 132, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted). The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately
vacated the Ninth Circuit's opinion because the plaintiff in the case, Michael Newdow, lacked
standing to challenge the elementary school's voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004).
19. While the idea of de-funding the enforcement of court orders has reached a newfound
level of popularity, it is not an entirely new idea. In the 1970s, Congress passed a series of
appropriations riders prohibiting the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW")
from ordering busing as a remedy for segregated school districts. The D.C. Circuit upheld the
riders, in large part because they left HEW with several alternative means of remedying school
segregation. See Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing HEW's
remaining options). In 1981, before the Supreme Court's ruling in Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), the House of Representatives considered an appropriations rider
that blocked the IRS from using funds to enforce any court order that prevented racially
segregated schools from obtaining tax exemptions. See 127 CONG. REc. 18,789-96 (1981); Brief
of Congressman Trent Lott Amicus Curiae, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (No. 81-3), available at http://www.j-bradford-elong.net/movabletype/refs/Mozilla_
Scrapbook2/lott.bju.amicus.brief.doc (providing the legislative history as support for the
argument that "the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit must be reversed"). The Newdow
and Glassroth, provisions mark a resurgence of the de-funding concept and, indeed, go further
than the Califano riders because they entirely deprive the executive branch of any power to
remedy identified constitutional violations.
20. Representative Hostettler lost his bid for reelection in November 2006. See Adam
Nossiter, G.O.P. Collapse in IndianaEmblematic of LargerLoss, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, § 1, at 28
(discussing Hostettler's loss).
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State, and the Judiciary. Each amendment stated that "[n]one of the funds
appropriated in [the appropriations bill] may be used to enforce the
judgment" of the Courts of Appeals in Newdow2 or Glassroth.2 The Newdow
amendment passed the House by a 307 to 119 vote, and the Glassroth
amendment passed 260 to 161.23 Ultimately, however, both amendments
died in the House-Senate Conference Committee and were stripped from
the final legislation. 24
Representative Hostettler again sought legislation to prevent the
enforcement of a federal court order after the U.S. District Court's January
31, 2005, decision in Russelburg v. Gibson County. In Russelburg, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana ruled that a Ten
Commandments monument on the lawn of the Gibson County, Indiana
courthouse-located in Hostettler's own district-violated the Establishment
25
Clause. Hostettler initially responded to the District Court's opinion by
writing a letter to President George W. Bush requesting that the President
instruct the Department of Justice and the U.S. Marshals Service "not to
enforce this or any appellate-including Supreme Court-decision or execute
any order that may ask for the removal of this monument by the Executive
Branch." 26 After the Justice Department replied that "the [United States
Marshals Service] would be required by federal law to comply with any"
court order in the Russelburg case, 2v Hostettler proposed an appropriations
21. H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. § 803 (as passed by House, July 23, 2003) (containing the text
of House Amendment 288, which stated: "None of the funds appropriated in this Act may be
used to enforce the judgment in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).").
22. Id. § 808 (containing the text of House Amendment 296, which stated: "None of the
funds appropriated in this Act may be used to enforce the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Glassroth v. Moore, decided July 1, 2003 or Glassroth v.
Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (M.D. Ala. 2002).").
23. Press Release, Office of U.S. Representative John N. Hostettler, Hostettler
Amendments Prohibit Funds to Enforce Court Decisions Against Pledge, Ten Commandments
(July 23, 2003) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
24. Compare H.R. 2799 § 803, with Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108199, 118 Stat. 108, 110-11 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
25. See Russelburg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-cv-149-RLY-WGH, slip op. at 9-10 (S.D. Ind.
Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://msl.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/riisselburg.pdf. The Russelburg
decision was pending on appeal to the Seventh Circuit when the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Van Orden v. Peny, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). The Seventh Circuit then vacated and
remanded Russelburg for reconsideration in light of Van Orden. On September 7, 2005, the
District Court ruled that Gibson County's Ten Commandments display did not violate the First
Amendment. See Russelburg v. Gibson County, No. 3:03-cv-149-RLY-WGH, 2005 WL 2175527, at
*2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 7, 2005), available at http://indianalawblog.com/documents/0Ocommand
ments.pdf.
26. Letter from John N. Hostettler, U.S. Representative, to George W. Bush, U.S.
President (Feb. 17, 2005) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
27. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
John Hostettler, U.S. Representative (Apr. 19, 2005) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (2000)); see also Letter from John N. Hostettler, U.S. Representative, to
William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (June 17, 2005) (on file
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amendment in the mold of his Newdow and Glassroth amendments. The
amendment, which was appended to an appropriations bill for the
Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, stated that "[n]one of the
funds appropriated in this Act may be used to enforce the judgment of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana in the case
of Russelburg v. Gibson County, decided January 31, 2005. "28 On June 15,
2005, the House approved the amendment with a vote of 242 to 182. 2 As
with the Newdow and Glassroth amendments, however, the Russelburg
amendment was stripped from the final legislation. 0
Even though the Newdow, Glassroth, and Russelburg amendments
ultimately did not became law, each commanded a substantial majority in
the House of Representatives. In light of these expressions of support and
continuing interest by the House in proposals to de-fund the enforcement of
federal court orderss it appears that enforcement-blocking provisions have
emerged as a trend that deserves careful analysis.
B. JUSTIFICATIONS AND CRITICISMS

Although enforcement-blocking provisions have garnered a substantial
number of votes in the House, there has been a notable paucity of debate
regarding the constitutional validity of the provisions. Representative
Hostettler's proposals all were predicated on his conclusion that the federal
courts' judgments in the Newdow, Glassroth, and Russelburg cases were
"inconsistent with both the clear intent of the framers and the Christian

with the Iowa Law Review) (urging that "the President would be compelled not to enforce the
District Court's-and subsequent Courts'-decisions regarding Russelburg v. Gibson Count").
28. H.R. 2862, 109th Cong. §805 (as passed by House, June 16, 2005) (containing the text
of House Amendment 278, sponsored by Representative Hostettler). Although Hostettler's
amendments have precluded the use of "any federal funds" to enforce the targeted court
decisions, he has characterized the effect of the amendments as "prevent[ing] any funding
from being used by the U.S. Marshals Service" to enforce the decisions. See 151 CONG. REC.
H4532 (daily ed. June 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hostettler); see also Press Release, Office of
U.S. Representative John N. Hostettler, House Passes Hostettler Amendment to Protect Gibson
County Ten Commandments (June 15, 2005) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) [hereinafter
Hostettler Press Release].
29. See Hostettler Press Release, supra note 28.
30.
CompareH.R. 2862 § 805, with Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (showing that the amendment
was stricken from the final version of the Act).
31.
In response to the federal district court's ruling in Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d
1103, 1131 (S.D. Ind. 2005), that the First Amendment bars specific references to Christianity
during invocations before the Indiana State Legislature, Representative Michael Sodrel (R-IN)
proposed a bill that would bar the expenditure of federal funds to enforce any court order
"relating to the content of speech occurring during the legislative session of a State legislative
body, unless such speech constitutes treason, breach of peace, or an admission of guilt of a
crime." H.R. 4776, 109th Cong. (2006); see also supra note 3 (describing the July 26, 2007,
passage of an appropriations rider barring the enforcement of two criminal judgments and
sentences).
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heritage of the United States. "02 While acknowledging that the district
court's decision in Russelburg was "consistent with more recent Supreme
Court decisions,"33 Hostettler argued that Congress is obligated and
empowered to correct the federal courts' constitutional errors.3 4 Citing the
statute that obligates the U.S. Marshals Service to "execute all lawful writs,
States, " 35
process, and orders issued under the authority of the United
Hostettler also argued that the executive branch is obligated not to execute
federal court orders deemed unlawful and unconstitutional by Congress. 6
Thus, enforcement-blocking provisions are predicated on a confident
view of Congress's interpretive competence in constitutional matters, a deep
skepticism regarding judicial supremacy, and an expansive understanding of
Congress's appropriations power as it relates to the Executive's lawenforcement prerogative. Upon concluding that three federal court
judgments were inconsistent with the Constitution, a majority of the House
of Representatives voted to use the appropriations power to correct the
erroneous judgments by refusing to fund the judgments' enforcement by
the executive branch.
Representative Hostettler cited three sources to support the idea that
Congress is empowered to rectify court judgments it deems erroneous. The
first was The Federalist No. 78's characterization of the federal judiciary as
"'the weakest of the three departments of power,"' having "'no influence
over either the sword or the purse"' and the ability to "'take no active
resolution whatever.'" 37 The second source was an 1804 letter from thenChief Justice John Marshall to then-Associate Justice Samuel Chase 3 s that
stated:

32. 151 CONG. REC. H4532 (daily ed. June 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hostettler in
support of Amendment 278 to H.R. 2862).
33. Representative Hostettler made this assessment prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), which found the display of a Ten Commandments
monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds constitutional.
151 CONG. REc. H4532 (daily ed. June 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hostettler in
34.
support of Amendment 278 to H.R. 2862).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (2000).
151 CONG. REC. H4532 (daily ed. June 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Hostettler in
36.
support of Amendment 278 to H.R. 2862).
37. See id (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 433-34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1999)).
38. See id. at H4533. At the time of Marshall's letter, Justice Chase was facing impeachment
by the House of Representatives. See Michael J. Gerhardt, ChancellorKent and the Search for the
Elements of Impeachable Offenses, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 91, 103 (1998). President Jefferson,
concerned about Chase's pro-federalist stance, quietly encouraged the House to impeach him.
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 22-23 (1992). The House delivered articles of
impeachment in 1804, ostensibly based on Chase's conduct in several political trials and his
remarks to a Baltimore grand jury. Id. at 22. The Senate acquitted Chase at the conclusion of
his trial in 1805. Gerhardt, supra, at 103. Chase is the only Supreme CourtJustice ever to have
been impeached.
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"I think the modern doctrine of impeachment [of judges] should
yield to an appellate jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of
those legal opinions deemed unsound by the legislature would
certainly better comport with the mildness of our character than
would a removal of the judge who has rendered them unknowing
of his fault."3 9
Marshall's biographer, Albert J. Beveridge, characterized Marshall's idea as
allowing "Senators and Representatives to be the final judges of any judicial
decision with which a majority of the House was dissatisfied., 40 Finally,
Representative Hostettler cited a portion of President Andrew Jackson's
1832 veto message regarding the Bank of the United States:
"Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution
swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is
understood by others ....

The opinion of the Judges has no more

authority over the Congress than the opinion of Congress has over
the Judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.
The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be
permitted to control the Congress or the Executive. "41
Accordingly, Representative Hostettler argued that the "acquiescence of the
Executive Branch to the will of the Judicial Branch is not consistent with"
the doctrine of the separation of powers.42

39. See 151 CONG. REC. H4533 (daily ed. June 15, 2005) (quoting Letter from John
Marshall, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to Samuel Chase, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the United States (Jan. 23, 1804), in 3 ALBERTJ. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF
JOHN MARSHALL 177, 177 (1919)).
40.
3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 39, at 178. Beveridge characterized Marshall's proposal as "in
direct contradiction to his reasoning in Marbury vs. Madison" and "the most radical method for
correcting judicial decisions ever advanced .... Appeals from the Supreme Court to Congress!"
Id. Other commentators, however, have disagreed with Beveridge's interpretation. See David E.
Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of JudicialReview, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 332 (1992).
Engdahl notes:
It seems unlikely that Marshall [was advocating] abridging that "finality" of
adjudication (in the resjudicatasense) ... [but is more likely that he] might have
found acceptable an arrangement under which constitutional questions could be
resolved by a popularly responsible branch, so long as the judges were left
independently to adjudicate cases in accord with their own understanding of the
resolutions thus politically made.
Id.
41.
Press Release, Office of U.S. Representative John N. Hostettler, Hostettler
Disappointed by Administration's Unprecedented Decision to Remove Ten Commandments
Monument From Public Land (June 17, 2005) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) (quoting
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 582 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)).
42. Id.
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Representative Jerrold Nadler, a Democratic Congressman from New
York, was the only member of the House to engage in any floor debate
challenging Hostettler's amendments. Nadler characterized Hostettler's
Russelburg amendment as "subversive in the extreme."43 Paraphrasing
Marbury v. Madison, Nadler argued:
[I]t is the foundation of law in this country that it is emphatically
the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is.... To fail to enforce
court orders, to arrogate to this body the right to say that we do not
like a particular decision ...

therefore we may not enforce the law,

is to say that we are no longer a Nation of laws. It is to say that we
are no longer a Nation governed by a Constitution.44
Thus, the congressional opposition relied heavily on the idea of judicial
supremacy and the fear of a slippery slope. Ultimately, however,
Representative Hostettler's arguments swayed a substantial majority of the
House of Representatives to vote in favor of the enforcement-blocking
provisions.45
C.

POTENTIAL EFFECT

Lest enforcement-blocking provisions be dismissed as symbolic exercises
that-even if they were to be enacted-would not substantially affect the
enforcement of the court orders at which they are aimed, it is important to
explore briefly how court orders are enforced.45

43. 151 CONG. REC. H4533 (daily ed.June 15, 2005) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
44. Id. Nadler claimed that Hostettler's logic would justify "a bill that says we shall not
enforce a decision of the court that says so and so may not go to jail or so and so must go to jail
or anything else." Id. Nadler concluded by saying:
[C]ourt orders must be enforced, and anyone who says that we shall not spend
money to enforce a court order because ... we do not agree with that particular
court order is subversive of liberty, subversive of the Constitution, subversive of
every human right, and subversive of the very notion of American liberty and
democracy.
Id.
45. See supra notes 23, 29 and accompanying text.
46. It is possible that the representatives who voted for these provisions did so more out of
a desire to lodge a symbolic protest of the courts' rulings than with the expectation that the
provisions would actually become law. See Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court FearCongress?, 90
MINN. L. REv. 1337, 1354-57 (2006) (suggesting that congressional measures proposed in
response to controversial court rulings often are rhetorical efforts to appeal to voters and
interest groups rather than genuine attempts to rebuke the courts). Even if this explanation is
correct, it neither guarantees that future enforcement-blocking proposals will languish in the
Senate nor resolves the difficult constitutional issues that these provisions raise. Moreover, the
question of whether the votes were cast as a symbolic protest is different from the question
discussed in this Section-namely, whether the provisions themselves are purely symbolic or
whether they could have a real effect on the enforcement of court judgments.
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in the vast majority of
ultimately comply with court orders
Parties
4
47
4s
case itself is an
Russelburg
cases, even in those most highly contested. The
excellent example of parties' general willingness to comply with court
orders: In response to Representative Hostettler's enforcement-blocking
proposal, Gibson County officials stated publicly that they had every
intention of complying with the district court's order at the conclusion of
the appeals process. 49
The federal courts' ability to generate voluntary compliance with their
orders likely reflects a high level of popular respect for the finality of
judgments. While this respect is, in large measure, the product of a culture
that respects the rule of law, 50 many scholars attribute litigants' willingness to
comply with court orders to the substance of the orders themselves: Court
judgments on constitutional matters have popular legitimacy because judges
incorporate the "political convictions of the nation into the substance of
law"5' and act with sensitivity to how citizens will receive their
constitutional
5 2
decisions.
47. See Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 67, 111 (1990) (observing that courts accurately expect that individuals will want to
comply with court orders). Indeed, federal contempt citations issued to enforce court orders
are relatively rare. Less than 0.5% (536 out of 130,078) of criminal matters on which U.S.
Attorneys worked in 2003 involved perjury or contempt. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004 tbls. 2.1 & 2.2 (2004), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfs04.pdf (noting, additionally, that less than one-half of
those charged were prosecuted); see also Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1049
(7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("The contempt power is rarely employed in civil trials.
It is rarely employed, period: out of 34,681 federal criminal proceedings begun in the 1983
reporting year, only 42 were prosecutions for contempt." (citation omitted)).
48. For example, when the Supreme Court ordered President Nixon to turn over the
incriminating Watergate tapes to prosecutors, he did so immediately. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 713-14 (1974) (rejecting Nixon's claims of executive privilege); see also KATHLEEN
M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 26 (15th ed. 2004) (noting that, after
the Supreme Court rendered its decision, "Nixon announced that he had instructed his counsel
'to take whatever measures are necessary to comply with that decision in all respects'").
49. See Maureen Hayden, Hostettler's Win in Ten Commandment Fight Puzzles Gibson Officials,
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, June 16, 2005, at B3.
50.
See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (calling the rule of law
"fundamental"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (outlining elements of the "rule of law," including its efficacy in
guiding people's actions as supreme legal authority); cf. Sheldon Ekland-Olson & Steve J.
Martin, OrganizationalCompliance with Court-OrderedReform, 22 LAw & SOC' REV. 359, 371 (1988)
(attributing institutional resistance to court-ordered prison reform in Texas to "a moral
climate" created by prison leaders in which court orders were seen as illegitimate).
51. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1039 (2004).
52. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Public Trust as a Dimension of Equal Justice: Some Suggestions to
Increase Public Trust, 36 CT. REV. 10, 13 (1999), available at http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/cr363/CR%2036-3%200'Connor.pdf. Justice O'Connor noted:
As judges, court administrators and attorneys, we all rely on public confidence and
trust to give the courts' decisions their force. We don't have standing armies to
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There is, of course, a significant minority of cases in which parties
refuse to comply with court orders. 3 Such defiance has been seen in all
types of cases and litigants-from private citizens, to local governments, to
the President himself. For example, in recent years, national security
reporters have refused to comply with subpoenas for their testimony
regarding information obtained from confidential sources, claiming that the
court orders violate the reporter's privilege under the First Amendment. 4 In
the years after Brown v. Board of Education,state and local governments across
the South engaged in widespread defiance of the Supreme Court's order to
integrate public schools with "all deliberate speed." 55 Alabama Chief Justice
Roy Moore adamantly refused to remove the Ten Commandments
monument from the Alabama State Judicial Building's rotunda, despite
multiple court orders to do so. 16 During the Civil War, President Lincoln
issued by the
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in defiance of an order
7
ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Mernymani

enforce opinions, we rely on the confidence of the public in the correctness of
those decisions. That's why we have to be aware of public opinions and of attitudes
toward our system ofjustice, and it is why we must try to keep and build that trust.
Id.; see also Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, JudicialExclusivity and PoliticalInstability, 84 VA. L. REV.
83, 94 n.76 (1998) ("Recognizing the nexus between its authority and public acceptance, the
Court is rarely out of step with prevailing mores."); Richard H. McAdams, The ExpressivePower of
Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1119 n.241 (noting that the judiciary "mostly avoid[s]
genuinely counter-majoritarian decisions").
53. Court orders that tend to inspire defiance and contempt often involve an injunction
in some form or a specific performance order. See Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 183, 219 (1971) (citing "an order to turn over property to the court or
another party" and "a prohibitory order forbidding a demonstration, a march, the continuance
of a nuisance, or the violation of a trademark or copyright" as examples of circumstances
frequently involving defiance and contempt).
54.
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145-53 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (affirming a decision holding New York Times reporter Judith Miller in contempt of
court for refusing to disclose the identities of her confidential sources); Wen Ho Lee v. Dep't of
Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 61-64 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming a decision holding four reporters in
contempt of court for refusing to disclose the identities of their confidential sources).
55. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968) (noting continuing statesponsored school segregation after Brown v. Board of Educationand requiring the state to offer a
desegregation plan that "promises realistically to work now"); see also infra notes 172-73 and
accompanying text (describing the aftermath of Brown); cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S.
265, 280 (1990) (invalidating a contempt finding against individual city employees and
requiring the district court to first impose sanctions against the city itself in an attempt to
secure compliance with remedial orders).
56. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
57. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 153 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); see infra notes
263-70 and accompanying text. Although President Jackson is famous for saying after the
Supreme Court's decision in Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), "John Marshall has
made his decision. Now let him enforce it," Jackson in fact was never in a position to defy the
Court. The State of Georgia mooted the decision soon thereafter, and the United States was
never called upon to enforce the Court's order. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supranote 48, at 25.
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Faced with defiance, courts have both inherent and statutory powers to
hold noncompliant parties in contempt of court. Upon the presentation of
clear and convincing evidence that a party has "'violate[d] a definite and
specific court order requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a
particular act or acts with knowledge of that order,' ' 59 a court may punish
that party by fine, imprisonment, or both. 60 Moreover, a court may order a
noncompliant party to pay the other party's costs or may issue writs of
attachment or execution. 61
While the threat or imposition of a contempt sanction is sometimes
enough to generate compliance with the court's underlying order, 62 a
contempt citation ultimately is still just words on a piece of paper. To collect
a fine, imprison a contemnor, or attach property, a federal court must enlist
the aid of the executive branch, namely, the U.S. Marshals Service, whose
statutory mandate is to "execute all lawful writs, process, and orders issued
under the authority of the United States. " 6 Indeed, Rule 4.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically designates the U.S. Marshals as
responsible for service of process of an order of civil commitment on a
person held in contempt of court. 64
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the U.S. Marshals Service. Section 27
of that Act provided for the appointment of a marshal for each federal
judicial district, and instructed the marshal "to execute throughout the
district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority

58. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) (citing United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 330-32 (1947) (Black and Douglas, ii., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)) (stating that courts have inherent power to enforce lawful orders by civil
contempt); SEC v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2000) (same); cf 18 U.S.C. § 401
(2000 & Supp. V 2005) (allowing a court to "punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority," including "[d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command").
59. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (quoting SEC v. Bankers Alliance Corp., 881 F. Supp.
673, 678 (D.D.C. 1995)).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 401.
61. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 70 (empowering a court to enforce a judgment through costshifting, writs of attachment, and writs of execution).
62. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 78 F.3d 1307, 1309-10 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that contemnors paid contempt fines and complied with subpoenas issued in
conjunction with the "Whitewater" investigation into campaign contributions to President
William Clinton); Reich v. Sea Sprite Boat Co., Inc., 64 F.3d 332, 333 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting
that the contemnor satisfied the judgment and paid the civil contempt penalty).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 566(c) (2000).
64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4.1 (a)-(b); accord Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l (Overseas) Ltd.
v. Tamraz, No. 97 Civ. 4759(SHS), 2006 WL 1643202, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2006) (holding
a noncompliant defendant in contempt of court and ordering the U.S. Marshals Service to
serve and arrest the defendant); Schmidt v.Joslin, No. 3-06-CV-0731-B, 2006 WL 1499773, at *2
(N.D. Tex. May 31, 2006) (noting an arrest by U. S. Marshals pursuant to an order holding the
arrestee in contempt of court).
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of the United States." 65 Further, the Act gave each marshal the "power to
command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty.,6 6 The U.S.
Marshals Service is part of the executive branch, formally designated as "a
bureau within the Department of Justice under the authority and direction
of the Attorney General., 67 The President appoints a U.S. Marshal for each
district, 68 69and employees of the bureau serve at the pleasure of the
President.
Today, the U.S. Marshals Service performs a variety of functions,
including providing security for judicial officials and witnesses,
and
apprehending fugitives, detaining and transporting prisoners,
- 70
managing and disposing of seized and forfeited properties. Its primary
role, however, is "to obey, execute, and enforce all orders of the United
States District Courts,71the United States Courts of Appeals and the Court of
International Trade."
Thus, Alexander Hamilton was quite correct when, in The Federalist No.
78, he stated that the judiciary must "ultimately depend upon the aid of the
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."7 2 When a party refuses
to comply with a federal court order and the court issues a contempt
citation, the court may have to call upon the U.S. Marshals Service to
execute and enforce that sanction.73

65. JudiciaryActof 1789, ch. 20, § 27,1 Stat. 73, 87.
66. Id
67. 28 U.S.C. § 561(a) (2000); Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63 (1890) ("[Mlarshals
of the United States... belong emphatically to the executive department of the government.").
68. United States Marshals Service, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Charter for U.S. Marshals
and Deputies, http://www.usdoj.gov/marshals/history/judiciary/judiary-actof__1789.8.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2008) (noting that six days after signing the Judiciary Act of 1789,
President Washington appointed marshals for each of the thirteen new federal judicial
districts).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 569(b) (2000); Chabal v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1220 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that despite assignment to the federal courts, the duties of the U.S. Marshals are
"purely executive" and, thus, marshals are still members of the executive branch who the
President may dismiss at will).
70. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.111 (2007) (listing the activities of the U.S. Marshals Service); see also
United States Marshals Service, Major Responsibilities of the U.S. Marshals Service, http://www.
usdoj.gov/marshals/duties/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2008). The Marshals Service's
budget has grown consistently, and in 2008, the estimated budget for the Service is $900
million. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 94 (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/
budget.html.
71.

28 U.S.C. § 566(a) (2000).

72.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
73.
Of course, federal court judgments do have a certain force of their own within the
court system itself, even in the absence of voluntary compliance or executive enforcement. For
example, courts themselves will accord preclusive effect to previous judgments, thereby barring
the re-litigation of already-decided issues and cases. However, for court judgments to avoid
becoming mere mantras, repeated case after case and judgment afterjudgment, and instead to
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Accordingly, passing an appropriations rider that bars the use of federal
funds to enforce a particular court order is not just a symbolic exercise, but
an action that could have a real and substantial effect on both the federal
courts and the executive branch. Although an enforcement-blocking
provision would not alter the substance of the court order or foreclose the
possibility of voluntary compliance, it certainly would alter the parties'
incentives and decrease the likelihood of compliance in controversial
constitutional cases. Parties would know that, in the face of noncompliance,
the U.S. Marshals Service would be affirmatively barred from taking any
steps to enforce the judgment or a contempt citation.74 Indeed, the ultimate
effect of such an appropriations rider would be to shackle the executive
branch from enforcing constitutional judgments, to undermine the
authority and legitimacy of the federal courts, and to foster greater popular
disrespect for the rule of law.
III.

FINAL COURT ORDERS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT: THE RELEVANT POWERS
AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF EACH COORDINATE BRANCH

Enforcement-blocking provisions raise substantial separation-of-powers
concerns with respect to Congress's relationship to both coordinate
branches of the federal government. With respect to the federal courts,
Congress is asserting its right to reassess constitutional rulings and to
diminish (if not vitiate) the force of a final court order. With respect to the
executive branch, Congress is inserting itself into the law-enforcement
function by attempting to preclude any enforcement activity on a particular
issue. Indeed, these separation-of-powers concerns are heightened
exponentially where Congress is attempting to undermine the otherwisewilling cooperation of the other two branches on matters within their
constitutional domain-namely, executive enforcement of federal court
orders.75
Whether Congress has the constitutional power to assert itself in these
ways depends upon the answers to several questions. First, is the nature of

impact actual conduct, courts must rely on other actors to comply with or execute their
judgments.
74. The enforcement-blocking provisions introduced by Representative Hostettler were
written in such broad terms that they fairly could be read as preventing the judiciary itself from
taking any steps to enforce its own judgments, e.g., by holding a contempt hearing. Because
Representative Hostettler characterized the effect of the provisions as preventing action by the
U.S. Marshals Service, however, this Article assumes that to be the primary effect of the
provisions. Cf Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (construing an
appropriations rider only to preclude executive action and not court dispositions in order to
avoid the "[t]urbulent issues under our fundamental instrument of government" that the latter
would raise).
75. The Russelburg amendment is the clearest example of the latter category, as the
executive branch had declared its intent to enforce the court's order if called upon. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
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the Article I congressional power over appropriations absolute and
unconditional? Second, does the Article II executive duty to "take Care" 76 to
enforce the laws require the executive branch to enforce federal court
judgments, or, at least, does it give the Executive the prerogative to decide
when and how to do so? And third, do the essential attributes of a proper
exercise of the Article III 'judicial Power"7 7 include the actual enforcement
of a final court order as to the parties involved in the case? Furthermore, is
the judiciary truly supreme in matters of constitutional interpretation?
This Part analyzes these questions and concludes that Congress's
appropriations power is not unconditional and cannot be exercised to
impinge on core functions of the coordinate federal branches.78 Because
Article III courts must issue final, executable rulings in all cases and
controversies, 79 and because those rulings on matters of constitutional
interpretation are supreme and binding,8° those core characteristics demand
certain responses and accommodations from the coordinate branches of
government.81 The executive branch, if called upon to do so, is likely
obligated to enforce federal courts' orders as to the parties before the
court."' Accordingly, Congress is, at the very least, constitutionally
prohibited from selectively de-funding such enforcement efforts.
CONGRESS'S APPROPRIATIONS PowER

A.

Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution states that "[n]o money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law."84 The power of the purse gives Congress "absolute control of
the moneys of the United States ",85 and enables Congress to control
government expenditures and to set policy priorities by virtue of resource
allocations. Indeed, ever since James Madison declared that "[t] his power
over the purse may . . . be regarded as the most complete and effectual

weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives
of the people,"8 6 commentators have emphasized the leverage that the

§ 3.

76.

U.S. CONST. art. II,

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. art. III, §§ 1-2.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.

81.

See infra Part III.C.

82.

See infra Part III.C.2.

83.
84.

See infra Part III.C.1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.

85. Hart v. United States, 16 Ct. Cl. 459, 484 (1880), affid, 118 U.S. 62 (1886).
86. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
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policy and to guide the
appropriations power gives Congress to affect
7
conduct of the other branches of government.8
Every year, Congress considers many appropriations bills,88 "which
provide funding for ... general government operations" and programs as
well as for each of the major executive and independent agencies.89 The
executive branch is statutorily prohibited from spending more than
Congress appropriates,90 and it must use the appropriated funds only for the
purposes Congress sets forth.9' While appropriations bills are pending in the
House or Senate, members of Congress can propose limitations ridersamendments to appropriations bills that prohibit the use of appropriated
funds for particular purposes.92 Limitations riders apply only to the fiscal
year to which the appropriation applies and cannot amend or repeal
existing law or create new law. 3
Congress's power to control appropriations and to pass limitations
riders, while broad, is not unlimited. Longstanding judicial precedent and
executive-branch interpretations have articulated constitutional limits on the
appropriations power-namely, that Congress may not use its power to
circumvent other constitutional prohibitions or guarantees or to impinge on
the Constitution's structural allocations of power. 94 There have been at least
a few occasions in history where Congress arguably has used its

87.
See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
DUKE L.J. 456, 457, 464-65, 471-80 (noting that "Congress frequently expresses policy
preferences through limitation riders," but cautioning against this trend on both practical and
constitutional grounds); Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of Appropriations Riders by
Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 460-61 (1992)
(noting Congress's attempts to use its appropriations power to, inter alia, "deprive former slaves
of the right to vote, to protect farm subsidies from executive scrutiny, to prevent the President
from making recess appointments, to enter into the conduct of negotiations with foreign
powers, and to remove suspected Communists from the federal payroll" (footnotes omitted)).
88.

See SANDY STREETER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS

PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 12 (2004), available at http://rules.house.gov/archives/97-684.pdf
("From FY1977 through FY2005, Congress . .. considered 13 regular appropriations bills and,
for FY2006 and FY2007, Congress generally considered 11 regular bills.").
89. Id. at 1.
90. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (a) (1) (A) (2000) ("An officer or employee of the United States
Government... may not make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount
available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation .... .").
See 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2000) ("Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects
91.
for which the appropriations were made . . . ."). This rule is subject to an exception for

necessary expenses: "[W] here an appropriation is made for a particular object, by implication it
confers authority to incur expenses which are necessary or proper or incident to the proper
execution of the object.., unless they are prohibited by law." 6 Comp. Gen. 619, 621 (1927).
92.

See, e.g., SANDY STREETER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EARMARKS AND LIMITATIONS IN

APPROPRIATIONS BILLS 2 (2004), availableat http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-518.pdf.
93. Id.
94. See infra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.

ENFORCEMENT OFFEDERAL COURT ORDERS

1337

appropriations power in a manner contrary to these principles. This pushand-pull between the branches indicates ongoing institutional debate
regarding the proper scope of the appropriations power. As an overall
matter, though, it seems clear that there must be proper limits on
Congress's appropriations power and that enforcement-blocking provisions,
in particular, contravene those limits.
As a primary matter, Congress may not use its appropriations power to
circumvent other explicit constraints on its own conduct. For example, in
United States v. Lovett, the Supreme Court struck down an appropriations
rider that barred the use of funds for the payment of particular federal
employees' salaries unless those individuals were re-appointed to their jobs
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. 96 Despite
Congress's argument that a "mere appropriation measure" could not be
challenged on constitutional grounds, 97 the Court found that Congress's
purpose was to punish the individuals for their political beliefs and,
therefore, that the appropriations rider was, in reality, a bill of attainder
barred by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution." The Court struck down
the appropriations rider as unconstitutional and "'contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution."' 99
The Lovett principle easily extends to bar Congress from using its
appropriations power toward any otherwise-unconstitutional end, such as
impingement on individual rights and encroachment on the structural limits
on the power of each coordinate branch of the federal government. In the
words of one judge who considered Lovett in the Court of Claims:
[T]he power of the purse may [not] be constitutionally exercised
to produce an unconstitutional result such as a taking of a citizen's
liberty or property without due process of law, a conviction and
punishment of a citizen for wholly innocent conduct, or a trespass
upon the constitutional function of another branch of
Government. 00

95. See infra notes 107-27 and accompanying text.
96. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) (holding the rider
unconstitutional).
97. Id. at 313.
98. Id. at 313-15 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
law shall be passed.")).
99. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also Archie Parnell,
CongressionalInterference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE LJ. 1360, 1385 & n.153
(1980) ("[A]ppropriations acts have been held just as unconstitutional as substantive
legislation.").
100. Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 152 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (Madden, J., concurring in
the result).
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two members of the
In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond,
1
,01
Supreme Court reiterated this "Lovett principle." In that case, the Court'
considered a situation in which a federal employee, following an executivebranch official's erroneous advice, engaged in part-time work that had the
effect of disqualifying him from receiving disability benefits under the
governing statute. 10 2 The majority held that, on the facts, the erroneous
information did not estop the government from denying the benefits.0 ' A
ruling to the contrary, they noted, would be akin to saying that the executive
branch could act to appropriate funds in the face of a statute to the
contrary. 104 Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred to note
that Congress's appropriations power is not as unlimited as the majority had
on the powers reserved to
suggested and could not be used to "encroach
05
Government."1
Federal
the
of
branch
another
The Justice Department has invoked the Lovett principle to critique
Congress's use of the appropriations power. For example, a 1933 Opinion of
the Attorney General stated:
Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations,
provide for a discharge of the functions of Government in a
manner not authorized by the Constitution. If such a practice were
permissible, Congress could subvert the Constitution. It might
condition that the executive department
make appropriations on
10 6
abrogate its functions.

Despite these articulated limits, Congress on a few occasions has used its
appropriations power arguably to encroach on powers reserved to the
executive branch or the federal courts. In all but one of these instances, the
affected coordinate branch rebuffed Congress's attempt. For example, even
before Lovett was decided, President Rutherford B. Hayes vetoed an Army
appropriations bill that would have prevented the deployment of the U.S.
military for the purpose of "'keep[ing] peace at the polls"' during

101.

Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 435 (1990) (White, J., concurring)

(noting that the majority did "not state that statutory restrictions on appropriations may never
fall even if they violate a command of the Constitution").
102.

Id. at 417-18 (majority opinion).

103.

Id. at 434.

104.

Id. at 428.

105. Id. at 435 (White, J., concurring). Justice White provided an example of such an
unconstitutional appropriations bill: "Congress could [not] impair the President's pardon
power by denying him appropriations for pen and paper." Id.; cf Knote v. United States, 95 U.S.
149, 154 (1877) (upholding an appropriations rider that limited the President's ability, after
granting a pardon, to refund proceeds from a pardonee's forfeited property because the
pardon power does not extend that far; therefore, the rider did not infringe on executive
power).
106. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 61 (1933); see also Todd D. Peterson, Controllingthe FederalCourts
Through the AppropriationsProcess, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 993, 999-1001 (providing other examples).
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congressional elections.1°7 In his veto message, President Hayes argued that
"[i]t is the right and duty of the National Government to enact and enforce
laws which will secure free and fair Congressional elections. " '0s Indeed,
Hayes asserted that "it is the duty of the executive department of the
Government to enforce" the Fifteenth Amendment and other laws meant to
ensure free and fair elections.' 0 9 He would not countenance Congress's
attempt to use its appropriations power to render "the National Government
powerless to enforce its own statutes. " 1 ° President Hayes expressed concern
that Congress, in passing the appropriations measure, was endangering "the
equal independence of the several branches of the Government. " "'
On at least two occasions, federal courts have declared appropriations
riders unconstitutional because the riders infringed on the domain of a
coordinate branch of the federal government. In United States v. Will, the
Supreme Court struck down an appropriations measure that sought to roll
back salary increases for federal judges." 2 The Court reasoned that the
rollbacks conflicted with the Compensation Clause, which explicitly insulates
judicial salaries from diminishment." 3
In NationalFederationof FederalEmployees v. United States, a federal district
court struck down a rider enacted to limit the implementation and
enforcement of President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 84,
which required employees with access to "classifiable" information to sign a
nondisclosure agreement regarding classified, and arguably non-classified,
information.' 4 The district court struck down the appropriations rider on
separation-of-powers grounds, holding that it encroached on the President's
authority over national security matters.' 5 Upon review, the Supreme Court6
avoided ruling on the constitutional merits of the appropriations rider."
Instead, it found that some aspects of the case had been mooted, so it

107.

Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (Apr. 29, 1879), reprinted in IX A COMPILATION
(1897) (citation omitted).

OF

THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 4476

108.

Id. at 4480.

109.

Id. at 4479.

110. Id. at 4480.
111. Id. at 4483.
112. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 230 (1980) (holding that the rider violated the
Compensation Clause).
113. Id. at 230 (holding that a statute effecting a direct diminution of Article III judges'
salaries violated the Compensation Clause, even though the same statute applied to other
federal officials as well). The Compensation Clause states that federal judges "shall, at stated
times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
114. See Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 676 (D.D.C.
1988) (describing the executive directive and appropriations rider).
115. Id. at 685.
116. Am. Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 159-60 (1989).
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vacated the district
court's decision and remanded the case for further
7
consideration.
One final example of Congress's use of its appropriations power,
arguably in violation of the Lovett principle, is found in the passage of the
Baxter Amendment. In the 1980s, the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department, under the direction of Assistant Attorney General William F.
Baxter, regularly filed amicus briefs advocating the overruling of the
Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., which held that resale price maintenance constituted a per se violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. n s In 1984, after the Department had filed one
such amicus brief in a pending Supreme Court case, Monsanto Co. v. SprayRite Service Corp.," 9 Congress passed an appropriations rider-the "Baxter
Amendment"-that prohibited the use of federal funds for "any activity, the
purpose of which is to overturn or alter the per se prohibition on resale
price maintenance in effect under Federal antitrust laws." 120 Although the
21
rider allowed an executive official to testify before Congress on this topic,

its language was broad enough to prevent an executive official from actually
proposing statutory amendments in line with the administration's
recommendations. 122 Moreover, it prevented the Department ofJustice from
advocating the administration's position during oral argument.•21
President Reagan signed the bill containing the Baxter Amendment,
despite his concern that "[e]ven as narrowly construed . . .the provision

potentially imposes an unconstitutional burden on executive officials
charged with enforcing the Federal antitrust laws. " 124 Indeed, the Baxter
Amendment arguably ran afoul of the principle of separation of powers as
well as the Recommendation Clause, which requires that the President "shall
...recommend to [Congress] such Measures as he shall judge necessary and

117. ld.at159-60.
118. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911).
119. See Brief for United States as Arnicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) (urging the Court not to create a per

se violation for certain pricing activities).
120.

Act of Nov. 28, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102.

121.

See id.

122. See id.; see also J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080
(1988) (describing the Baxter Amendment).
123. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752
(1984) (No. 82-914), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/ 1980-1989/1983/1983_82_914/
argument/. At one point in the argument, Justice O'Connor asked the government's advocate
whether, "had Congress not adopted the proviso in its appropriation act, [he would] have made
possibly a different argument to us today." Id. The attorney responded, "We have not withdrawn
part 2(b) of our brief [advocating for the overruling of the Dr. Miles decision], Justice
O'Connor. Beyond that I would prefer not to deal with that question." Id.

124.

Statement on Signing a Fiscal Year 1984 Appropriations Bill, 2 PUB.

28, 1983).

PAPERS

1627 (Nov.
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expedient. ''125 Despite President Reagan's cautionary signing statement,126the
constitutionality of the Baxter Amendment was never litigated or tested.
Thus, over time, there has been institutional tension regarding the
scope of Congress's appropriations power. On a few occasions, Congress
arguably has attempted to use that power to encroach on the activities and
prerogatives of the coordinate federal branches. More often than not, the
affected branch has pushed back and articulated a limiting principle-what
this Article calls the "Lovett principle"-for the exercise of the
appropriations power. That principle has considerable breadth: Congress
may not use its appropriations power to circumvent other textual
prohibitions on its own conduct, to infringe on individual liberties, or to
encroach on the constitutional
duties or prerogatives of a coordinate branch
1 7
of the federal government. 2
Although it is easy enough to say that the appropriations power is not
absolute, it is more difficult to determine whether enforcement-blocking
appropriations riders in fact encroach on core judicial or executive
functions. Congress is certainly entitled to set overall funding levels for
executive agencies, including the U.S. Marshals Service, and indeed has
passed appropriations measures setting a general budget for the Marshals
Service in every fiscal year since 1789. 12 Moreover, it seems readily apparent
that Congress has considerable discretion over the upper limits of that
budget; it need not provide the Service with a blank check that would enable
the Service to take each and every possible measure, regardless of cost, to
ensure the execution of each federal court order.
However, a general appropriations bill for the Marshals Service is
entirely different in nature from an enforcement-blocking appropriations
rider. The former operates at the macro level, affirmatively providing
funding for wide-ranging executive enforcement efforts in support of the
federal courts. By contrast, the latter attempts to micromanage executive
enforcement efforts by selectively de-funding the enforcement of a
particular court order. Enforcement-blocking riders raise specific

125. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Sidak, supra note 122, at 2118-28 (evaluating the
constitutionality of "muzzling laws," including the Baxter Amendment, under the
Recommendations Clause).
126. The Supreme Court, however, did overrule Dr. Miles in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007), holding instead that "vertical price restraints are
to be judged by the rule of reason." Id. Interestingly, in discussing whether the principle of stare
decisis mitigated in favor of retaining the Dr. Miles rule, the Court quickly dismissed the claim
that the Baxter Amendment indicated congressional ratification of the rule. See id. at 2724
(stating that the amendment "might demonstrate a different proposition: that Congress could
not pass legislation codifying the [Dr. Miles] rule and reached a short-term compromise
instead").
127. See Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 152 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (Madden,J., concurring
in the result).
128. See supra note 70.
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constitutional concerns because they have such an immediate impact on
both judicial and executive actions and directly target specific rulings.
The Lovett principle thus has direct relevance to the constitutionality of
enforcement-blocking riders. If Article III requires the federal judiciary to
issue final, executable judgments, then Congress may not prohibit the courts
from doing so. Likewise, if the executive branch has a constitutional
obligation to enforce final court orders, then Congress may not prevent the
executive branch from carrying out that duty. Alternatively, if the
Constitution vests sole discretion in the executive branch whether to enforce
a final court order, Congress may not insert itself into that decision. The
next Section addresses these issues.
B.

THE ARTICLE IIIJUDICIAL POWER

1. Finality and Executability as Essential Components of the
Exercise of the Judicial Power
Article III of the Constitution vests the 'judicial Power" of the United
States "in one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
2 9
The second Section of
may from time to time ordain and establish."
Article III extends the 'judicial Power" to nine categories of "cases" and
"controversies" but is otherwise silent as to the precise nature of the 'judicial

Power." 30
Extensive studies of the development of Article III at the Constitutional
Convention indicate that the framers conceived of the judicial power as the
"authority and obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred,
independently, finally, and effectually, to decide the whole case and nothing
but the case on the basis of legal reasoning, not political expedience."'' The
federal courts themselves have developed justiciability doctrines in order to
define and delimit the central prerogatives of the judicial branch. They have
developed separation-of-powers principles that set the parameters for the
of permissible responses
proper exercise of the judicial power and the range
2
1
branches.
coordinate
the
by
exercise
an
to such

U.S. CONST.art. III, § 1, cl.1. Congress, of course, created a system of lower federal
129.
courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789. Today, there are thirteen federal circuit courts and ninetyfour federal district courts. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.4.3, at 24,
§ 1.4.4, at 27 (5th ed. 2007).
130. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
131. James F. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of
DecisionmakingRequired of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 773 (1998); see also 1 JAMES
WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLEJAMES WILSON, L.L.D. 405 (Philadelphia, Bronson &
Chauncey 1804) ("The judicial authority consists in applying, according to the principles of
right and justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases, in which the
manner or principles of this application are disputed by the parties interested in them.").
132. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (explaining that the "case" and "controversy"
requirements of Article III "define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
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The prohibition on advisory opinions is one of the principal
delimitations of the judicial power. Based on Article III's "case" and
"controversy" requirement-and its negative corollary, that the judicial
power does not extend to anything but a case or controversy-the federal
courts require that a case satisfy two basic criteria. First, it must present an
"actual

dispute

between

adverse

litigants,"
• ,,134

133

rather

than

"abstract,

Second, there must be a
hypothetical, or contingent questions.
"substantial likelihood that a federal court decision in favor of a claimant
will bring about some change or have some effect" 3 5 as to the parties before

the court. In the typical case, the "change" or "effect" of a court's judgment
13 6
Injunctive relief
will be "the award of process or the payment of damages."
137
criterion.
this
satisfy
also
can
and declaratoryjudgments
The bar on advisory opinions is both a limit on the power of the federal
courts and an affirmative indicator of the nature of the judicial power. The
first criterion-the presence of an actual dispute-indicates that a proper
exercise of the judicial power will settle a controversy between parties by
defining their legal rights and obligations. While it is open to debate
whether the legal reasoning in a court's opinion is binding,18 there is little
question that a court's judgment and order as to the parties before it is
binding on those parties. 139 Indeed, as the Supreme Court made clear in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Constitution "gives the Federal Judiciary
the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them... [I] n short, ....
'a judgment conclusively resolves the case' because 'a "judicial Power" is one
to render dispositive judgments."1 40 Judgments based on constitutional

power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government").
133. ERWIN CHEMEPINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 2.4, at 54 (3d
ed. 2006); see also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (stating that federal courts
are powerless to decide questions that will not affect the litigants' rights).
134. Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) (citations omitted).
135. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 133, § 2.4, at 56.
136. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
137. See id.(finding that declaratory judgment actions have been held to be within the
judicial power even though the result of the adjudication may not require a concrete award of

process or damages).
138.

Compare Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter ofJudgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L.

REv. 123, 148, 154 (1999) (advocating the view thatjudicial opinions, as opposed tojudgments,
call for deference, but not obedience), with Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
ExtrajudicialConstitutionalInterpretation,110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1371-72 (1997) (advocating the
view thatjudicial opinions carry the same force asjudgments).
139. See, e.g., Marc S. Mayerson, Executability of Article III Judgments and the Problem of
CongressionalDiscretion: United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, 35 DEPAUL L. REV.51,

59 (1985).
140. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (quoting Frank H.
Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 905, 926 (1989-1990)).
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are entitled to no less authority than those based on private
assessments 141
legal rights.

The second criterion-that the federal court's judgment have the
potential to "be carried into effect"- 42-necessarily implies that, to properly
exercise the judicial power, a federal court's decision as to the parties' rights
4
1
and obligations must be accompanied by a judgment that is executable.
To be executable, a judgment must "admit[] of specific relief . .. of a
conclusive character." 144 Absent the rendering of an executable judgment,
judicial intervention would have no real-world effect and would be
tantamount to an advisory opinion. As Justice Johnson put it in 1808, " [t] he
term 'judicial power' conveys the idea, both of exercising the faculty of
judging and of applying physical force to give effect to a decision." 14 5 In the
words of Chief Justice Taney in Gordon v. United States, "[t]he award of
execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court
exercising [Article III] judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of
the term, without it." 146 Thus, unless it issues an executable judgment, a
federal court is merely acting in an advisory capacity, and is doing so beyond
its Article III powers.
Finality and executability are thus two sides of the same coin, and both
are essential aspects of a proper exercise of the Article III judicial power.
When a federal court issues a judgment that is not final or executable as to
the parties before it, it is not exercising the judicial power within the
meaning of Article III.
2.

Finality in Matters of Constitutional Interpretation

Another aspect of the judicial power allocated to the federal courts by
Article III is the power to review the constitutionality of executive and
legislative acts. While the power ofjudicial review is not explicitly set forth in
the Constitution, in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme
141. See Post & Siegel, supra note 51, at 1035 ("[W]e nonetheless expect constitutional
rights to be judicially enforceable to the same extent as are ordinary legal entitlements."). Post
and Siegel suggest that judgments involving constitutional rights should have the same

entitlement to finality as judgments involving private legal rights because "we want citizens to
hold rights against their government that are as secure and as reliable as the private rights that
they hold against their fellow citizens." Id.
142. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (stating that judicial power requires "actual
controversies by ajudgment which can be carried into effect").
143. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (describing the
characteristics of an Article III controversy).

144.

Id. at 241.

145. Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 361 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420)
("The term 'power' [in Article III] could with no propriety be applied, nor could the judiciary
be denominated a department of [the] government, without the means of enforcing its
decrees.").
146. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864); see also Mayerson, supra note 139, at
62 n.70 (discussing later courts' acknowledgment or acceptance of Taney's statement).
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Court famously declared that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." 147 The Court invalidated a
portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that had attempted to expand the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction beyond that conferred by Article III.
The Court emphasized that the "powers of the legislature are defined and
limited," 48 that the "very essence of judicial duty" is to measure acts of
that "an act of the legislature,
Congress against the Constitution, 149 and
50
repugnant to the constitution, is void."
Of course, judicial review is not necessarily the same as judicial
supremacy.'1' Departmentalist scholars long have argued that Marbuiy's
principle does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the federal
judiciary has the final say as to the meaning of the Constitution in all
settings. 152 Rather, they argue, the coequal and coordinate nature of the
three branches of the federal government requires that each branch have
the
for interpreting
and
responsibility
independent authority
Constitution.5 5 Just as the Supreme Court in Marbuiy was not bound by
Congress's view of the Constitution, Congress and the Executive, acting
"within [their own] sphere[s]," should not be bound by the Court's view of
the Constitution. 54
Without getting into the merits of this scholarly debate, two things are
clear. First, even among departmentalists, few dispute that the federal
147. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Some commentators
challenge Marbury's status as a legal landmark. The foundations for and concept of judicial
review, they say, were established in the Judiciary Act of 1789. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber,
EstablishingJudicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REv. 609, 610, 612
(2003) (characterizing Marbury as merely an "unoriginal defense" ofjudicial review). Whatever
Marbury's pedigree, however, the concept of judicial review itself has proven crucially
important.
148. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
149. Id. at 178.
150. Id. at 177.
151. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 52, at 91 n.58 ("Marbury, of course, did not rule that the
Court's constitutional interpretations were final and definitive; instead, the Court simply
declared that it had the power to invalidate unconstitutional Congressional action.").
152. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979, 988 (1987)
(rejecting the proposition that "the Court's constitutional interpretations... mea[n] the same
as the Constitution itself"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 217, 225-26 (1994). But see Alexander & Schauer, supra note
138 passim (defending judicial supremacy on normative grounds).
153. See Meese, supra note 152, at 985-86; Paulsen, supra note 152, at 228-40; cf THE
FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (stating that no branch
"can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their
respective powers"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 435-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999) (declaring that judicial review does not "by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power").
154. Paulsen, supra note 152, at 218, 225-26. This, of course, begs the question of precisely
what functions fall within the sphere of each branch. See also id. at 245 ("[E]ach branch has a
power of constitutional review over the constitutional judgments of the others .... ").
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judiciary in fact does have the final say in one particular setting: a final
judgment rendered by a federal court-even one predicated on a
constitutional ruling-is binding as to the parties before the court itself. 5
Departmentalists frequently invoke President Lincoln as having articulated
the premise of coordinate and coequal constitutional review in the course of
his debates with Stephen Douglas. 156 Indeed, Lincoln argued that the
Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision was wrong and that it was not binding
on voters or on the coordinate federal branches. 57 Yet, he acknowledged
that "in so far as [the Supreme Court] decided in favor of Dred Scott's
master against Dred58 Scott and his family, I do not propose to disturb or
resist the decision.'
Second, as a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court itself long has
asserted its supremacy in constitutional interpretation. The Court most
recently vigorously asserted the supremacy of judicial-as opposed to
congressional-pronouncements as to constitutional meaning in City of
Boerne v. Flores.15 9 In 1990, the Court held in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith that the First Amendment permits the
application of neutral, generally applicable laws to religious practices even
6
when those laws are not supported by a compelling governmental interest. 0
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") in an
attempt to overrule that holding.' 6 1 In City of Boerne, the Court struck down
RFRA, reasserting the judiciary's "power to interpret the Constitution in a
case or controversy" 16 and clarifying that Congress's power to "enforce" the
155. See supra note 139 and accompanying text; cf infra notes 254-55, 271-75 and
accompanying text (discussing the Executive's duty to enforce final judgments and noting only
one categorical exception to the view that such a duty in fact exists).
156. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 152, at 985.
157. Id. (citing Abraham Lincoln & Stephen A. Douglas, Sixth Joint Debate at Quincy,
Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 255 (Roy P. Basler
ed., 1953)).
158. Id. (citing Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (July 17, 1858), in 2 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 516 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
159. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) ("Interpretation of the law and the Constitution is the primary mission
of the judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to resolve a case or controversy.");
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) ("[A] constitutional decision of this Court
...may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress. . . ."); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000) ("[E]ver since Marbuty this Court has remained the ultimate expositor
of the constitutional text.").
160. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
161.
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515.
162. Id. at 524. Although City of Boerne focused on the power of the Supreme Court, there
appears to be no reason to distinguish between judgments rendered by the Supreme Court and
unappealed final judgments of lower federal courts. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman
Power, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 81, 82 (1993); infra note 192 (discussing Gordon v. United States,
117 U.S. 697 app. (1864). Both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts exercise the same
Article III power, and the unappealed final judgment of a lower federal court is the judiciary's
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provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment16 3 does not entitle Congress to
"chang[e] what the right is" 164 or to "determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation." 165 Rather, the Court declared, that power resides
solely with the federal judiciary.
Judicial pronouncements as to the meaning of the Federal Constitution
are supreme not only as to Congress, but also as to state officials. The
Supreme Court's authority extends to the review of the constitutionality of
state court decisions,166 state laws, and the actions of individual state officials.
In Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court strongly asserted the supremacy
of its pronouncements over state actors. 67 After major resistance to the
Court's 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1) 168 in the
Arkansas state legislature,' 69 as well as armed confrontations over the
integration of Little Rock's Central High School, 170 the Little Rock School
Board sought court permission to postpone implementation of its

final word as to the parties to which the judgment is directed. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
(vesting the "judicial Power" in "one Supreme Court" and "in . . . inferior Courts"); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803) ("The constitution vests the whole
judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as congress
shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases
arising under the laws of the United States ...
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
164. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
165. Id.; see also id. at 529 ("If Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount
law, unchangeable by ordinary means.'" (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177)). In City of Boerne, the
Court articulated a test for determining whether a statute is a proper exercise of Congress's
Section 5 enforcement powers: "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." Id. at 520. RFRA failed
to satisfy the "congruence and proportionality" test so articulated. See id. at 532.
166. The Court first asserted its authority to review the constitutionality of state court
decisions in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
167. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
168. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial segregation in state schools); see also Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (ordering state officials to make a "prompt and
reasonable start toward full compliance" with Brown 1).
169. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting amendment 44 of the Arkansas Constitution,
which instructed the state legislature to resist the "[u]n-constitutional desegregation decisions
of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 1955 of the United States Supreme Court"); see also ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 80-1525 (1960) (relieving school children from compulsory attendance at desegregated
schools).
170. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 11 (describing the Arkansas National Guard's efforts to obstruct
desegregation). In September 1957, the Governor of Arkansas dispatched units of the Arkansas
National Guard to Little Rock's Central High School to prevent African American students
from entering. Id. The students were permitted to enter only after the federal district court
entered an injunction and President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to protect the
students. Id. at 11-12. Note that President Eisenhower's intervention to enforce the Court's
decision ultimately demonstrates the dependence of the federal courts on the Executive to
enforce their judgments.
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desegregation program.'
The Supreme Court rejected the request,
declaring that because "the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
enunciated by [the] Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land,"
every state legislator, executive, and judicial officer was bound to adhere to
that constitutional rule. 172 "'If the legislatures of the several states may, at
will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the
rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a
solemn mockery .

. . .'

A Governor
who asserts a power to nullify a federal
17 3

court order is similarly restrained."
Thus, as a doctrinal matter, Marbuiy, City of Boerne, and Cooper establish a
vision of a muscular federal judiciary that stands strong in the face of federal
and state legislative and executive challenges regarding the meaning of the
Constitution. 7 4 Congress's power to regulate the structure and conduct of
the federal judiciary'7 5 does not extend to the substantive core of the courts'
work-namely, constitutional adjudication. In that realm, the federal courts
speak with finality and authority, subject only to their own internal appellate
review processes. Although citizens and the coordinate branches of the
federal government retain power to correct the federal courts' reading of
171.
Id.at 11.
172. Id. at 18 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704
(1974) (noting the "responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution");
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("[T]his Court [is the] ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution ...
."); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 375, at 267 (4th ed. 1873) ("[Tlhere is a final and common arbiter provided by the
Constitution itself, to whose decisions all others are subordinate; and that arbiter is the supreme
judicial authority of the courts of the Union.").
173. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18-19 (quoting United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136
(1809)). Although Coopeis strong language shows that courts also will not tolerate refusals by
state governments to comply with their judgments, the aftermath of Cooper-and of Brown I
itself-demonstrates the practical limits of the federal courts' power and, indeed, the courts'
reliance on the executive branch for enforcement of their decrees. For more than a decade
after the Court's demand for compliance, Southern states made only minimal progress toward
school desegregation. In 1968, in Green v. County School Board, the Supreme Court declared that
"delays [in desegregation] are no longer tolerable" and ordered the school board in question
"to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to
work now." Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968).
174. But cf Devins & Fisher, supra note 52, at 91-94 (arguing that the Court declares its
supremacy out of "fear[] that the political order will ignore its command" or when its
constitutional interpretation is "linked with popular outcomes").
175. The Constitution does, of course, grant Congress substantial power to regulate the
federal courts. Congress may decide whether to establish any lower federal courts and also may
regulate their jurisdiction. Compare, e.g., Akhil Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of theJudiciaryAct of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1565 (1990) (arguing that Congress has plenary authority to alter
or abolish all federal court jurisdiction except that which is within the original jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court), and Julian Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction:A
Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 671, 763 (1997) (same), with Lawrence Gene
Sager, Forward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
FederalCourts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 89 (1981) (claiming that the structure of the Constitution as
a whole limits Congress's power to withdraw federal courtjurisdiction entirely).
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the Constitution via the longer-term political processes of constitutional
amendment
and "[p]artisan
entrenchment through
presidential
appointments, " 76 the shorter-term substantive responses are limited at
best.1 7 The federal courts will not countenance attempts to supersede their
reading of the Constitution.
C.

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE RESPONSES TO EXERCISES OF THEJUDICIAL POWER

Having identified at least two of the core aspects of the exercise of the
Article III judicial power-final, executable rulings in all cases and
controversies, and the doctrine of judicial supremacy-the next question is
how the two other branches of the federal government may respond to final,
executable judicial orders in constitutional cases. As a general matter,
executive and legislative responses to final court orders based on substantive
constitutional rulings must be measured against the value of judicial
independence and the doctrine of separation of powers. The "very
structure" of the Constitution enshrines the concept of separation of powers
by delineating the powers of the three separate branches in Articles I, II, and
III.178

The Supreme Court sometimes has taken a formalistic perspective on
separation-of-powers questions, looking primarily to the structural power
delegations made in the constitutional text. 79 At other times, the Court has
taken a more functional approach, focusing on "the extent to which the
[congressional act being challenged] prevents the executive branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions" and then balancing
this burden against the "need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress."8 In cases involving conflicts between
Congress and the federal judiciary, the Court has asked whether Congress

176. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe ConstitutionalRevolution, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1045, 1068 (2001).
177. U.S. CONsT. art. V (setting forth the amending process); see also Post & Siegel, supra
note 51, at 1030 (noting that judicial supremacy does not "prevent citizens from attempting to
endow their constitutional beliefs with legal authority" through a constitutional amendment
and through electing a presidential candidate who promises to appoint judges with particular
constitutional perspectives).
178. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
179. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986) (striking down a portion of
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, which gave the Comptroller
General power to make budget cuts); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952-53 (striking down the legislative
veto as a violation of constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures found in the
Presentment Clause); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926) (striking down a
statute that required the President to obtain Senate approval for the removal of postal officials
as a violation of the Take Care Clause).
180. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 691, 695 (1988) (applying this principle to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
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of the federal courts 18 1
has undermined the "essential attributes"
82
prerogatives."
encroached on their "central
1.

or

Legislative Responses to Final Court Orders

The Supreme Court's separation-of-powers cases firmly establish that
when congressional legislation undermines either the finality of a court
order or the executability of that order, that legislation encroaches on the
central prerogatives of the federal judiciary and, thus, violates the principle
of separation of powers. 183 How this general rule is to be applied in any
particular case, however, depends on the precise parameters and operation
of the statute in question.
In Hayburn's Case, the members of the Court considered an Act of
Congress that allowed federal circuit courts to determine the amount of
pensions Revolutionary War veterans should receive, but then gave the
184
Secretary of War discretion to either accept or reject the courts' findings.
Five Justices issued statements in their capacities as circuit justices, noting
that the statutory scheme impinged on a sphere of activity reserved solely for
the judiciary: "[N]either the Legislative nor the Executive branch[] can
constitutionally assign to the Judiciary any duties, but such as are properly
judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner."185 The flaw with the
scheme was that it allowed for final court judgments to be "revised and
controlled by the legislature, and by an officer in the executive department.
Such revision and control we deemed radically inconsistent with the
independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts .... 11186
Accordingly, Hayburn's Case has come to stand for the principle that
Congress cannot vest substantive review of the decisions of Article III courts

181.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61, 76 (1982)
(finding that Congress does not have the power to remove the essential attributes of judicial
power from Article III courts and give those attributes to Article I courts); see also Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986) (stating that an Article I court's
constitutional validity depends on the extent to which it "exercises the range ofjurisdiction and
powers normally vested only in Article III courts," as well as "the origins and importance of the
right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements
of Article III").
182. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) ("[Tlhe Constitution prohibits one branch
from encroaching on the central prerogatives of another .... "); see also New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (stating that the separation of powers is violated when "one
branch [of the federal government] invades the territory of another"); cf Gordon v. United
States, 117 U.S. 697 app. at 700 (1886) ("The judicial power of the United States is in point of
origin and title equal with the other powers of the government, and is as exclusively vested in
the court created by or pursuant to the Constitution, as the legislative power is vested in
Congress, or the executive power in the President." (internal quotation omitted)).
183. See supraPart III.B.1.
184. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792).
185. Id. at410n.t.
186. Id.
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in either executive or legislative branch officials, because doing so would
permit those branches to assume the judicial power and to "'annul a final
judgment.""87
In Gordon v. United States, the Court considered the validity of a statute
that vested the power to satisfy a final judgment in Congress itself.'8, The
statute in question provided that if the Court of Claims, or Supreme Court
on appeal, were to enter a final judgment in favor of a claim against the
United States, it would fall to the Secretary of the Treasury to request the
appropriation of funds to satisfy the judgment, and then to the Congress
itself to decide whether in fact to appropriate the funds to satisfy the
judgment.' 89 Thus, although the statute did not allow either the executive or
the legislative branch to revise the substance of the judgment itself, it did
give the legislative branch power essentially to nullify the judgment by
refusing to satisfy it.' 90
The Court found that this was a distinction without a difference and
struck the law down. ChiefJustice Taney authored an opinion"' in which he
argued that the statute operated to prevent the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction from exercising the judicial
power set forth in Article 111.19' He explained:
[T]he award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every
judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no
judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such
an award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving
the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an
opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any

187.

Miller, 530 U.S. at 343 (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 224

(1995)).
188. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 app. (1864) (opinion issued); see also Gordon v.
United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864) (order dismissing case).
189. Gordon, 117 U.S. app. at 698.
190. See id. app. at 698-99 (discussing the statute's removal of the court's power to enter a
final judgment).
191.

Taney had circulated his draft opinion to his colleagues just before his death. See id.

app. at 697. The draft was lost and the Court announced only its judgment in the case. Id.; see
also Gordon, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) at 561 (1864). Taney's draft was found in 1886 and published in

the appendix to the U.S. Reports. See Gordon, 117 U.S. app. at 697; see also United States v.Jones,
119 U.S. 477, 477-78 (1886) (discussing Gordon's history). The Supreme Court subsequently has
treated Taney's opinion as authoritative. See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226; N. Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.38 (1982); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 484

(1894) (plurality opinion).
192. Although most of the opinion focuses on the judicial power vested in the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Taney made clear that inferior federal courts possess the same judicial
power and are "authorized to render a judgment which will bind the rights of the parties ...
and upon which the appropriate process of execution may be issued." Gordon, 117 U.S. app. at
697; see also supra note 162 (stating that there is no reason to distinguish between Supreme
Court and lower federal court judgments).
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operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at
some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court
to carry its opinion into effect.193
Thus, by ultimately vesting the decision whether to execute a court
judgment in the hands of Congress, the statute allowed "[t]he real and
ultimate judicial power [to] be exercised by the Legislative Department, and
194
not by that department to which the Constitution has confided it."

Although Gordon itself dealt with judgments issued against the U.S.
government, the opinion's elucidation of the nature of the Article III power
is probative beyond that particular factual context.
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the Court made clear that the Article III
judicial power contemplates the entry of final, binding judgments as to the
parties in a case. 19 5 Therefore, Congress cannot command that courts
reopen their final judgments. In 1991, the Court held that litigation brought
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5
of the Securities and Exchange Commission must be commenced within one
year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within
three years after such violation. 196 Later that same year, Congress added
section 27A(b) to the 1934 Act, allowing any lawsuit that had been dismissed
after the Supreme Court's ruling to be reinstated if it would have been
timely filed under applicable state law.197
The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of section 27A(b)
in Plaut and concluded that it violated the Constitution's separation of
powers because it required "the federal courts to exercise '[t]he Judicial
Power of the United States' . . . in a manner repugnant to the text, structure,
and traditions of Article III. " l o" The Article III "'judicial Power' is one to

render dispositive judgments,"' 99 and, thus, the separation of powers

193.
194.

Gordon, 117 U.S. app. at 702.
Id. app. at 703.

195.

See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240 (holding unconstitutional the law in question that required

federal courts to reopen certain previous judgments).
196. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 361 (1991).
197. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236, 2287 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (2000)).
198. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217-18 (quoting U.S. CONST. art III, § 1). The Court examined the
history of the colonial period, in which there were several legislative efforts to correct court

judgments by vacating the judgments and ordering new proceedings, and concluded that the
Framers sought to separate the legislative from the judicial power and to insulate final
judgments from legislative revision. See id. at 220-21; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 207
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (criticizing the legislative department for
"drawing all power into its impetuous vortex"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 452 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot

reverse a determination once made in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for
future cases.").
199. Plaut,514 U.S. at 219.
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requires Congress to respect the finality of federal court judgments. 2°°
"Having achieved finality... ajudicial decision becomes the last word of the
judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and
Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to
that very case was something other than what the courts said it was." 20' The
Court went on to state, "The separation-of-powers violation here ...

consists

of depriving judicial judgments of the conclusive effect that they had when
they were announced."20 2 The separation-of-powers prohibition "is violated
when an individual final judgment is legislatively rescinded for even the very
best of reasons, such as the legislature's genuine conviction . . . that the

judgment was wrong.,,203
Hayburn's Case, Gordon, and Plaut each dealt with legislative attempts to
disrupt court judgments awarding monetary relief. In such situations, it is
clear that separation-of-powers principles bar either coordinate branchCongress or the Executive-from undermining the force of the judgments
of Article III courts. When a court renders its judgment and awards
monetary relief to a party, the party's right to the relief becomes "absolute,
and it is the duty of the court to enforce" the judgment.2 04 Thus, an "act of
[C]ongress cannot have the effect and operation to annul the judgment of a
20 5
court already rendered, or the rights determined thereby."
The final judgments in Newdow, Glassroth, and Russelburg-the cases
targeted by the enforcement-blocking provisions discussed in this
Article 26-did not award monetary damages, but instead accorded
injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. Legislative responses to court judgments
awarding injunctive relief have been subject to a different analysis than that
articulated in Hayburn's Case, Gordon, and Plaut. Such statutory initiatives
were considered in Pennsylvaniav. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.2° 7 and, most
208
recently, Miller v. French.
In 1851, the Supreme Court ordered that a low bridge across the Ohio
River at Wheeling "be raised or permanently removed" because it obstructed

200. See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948)
("Judgments within the powers vested in the courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution
may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of
Government.").
201.

202.
203.
204.
421,431
205.
206.
207.
208.

Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227.

Id. at 228.
Id.
Pennsylvania v.Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling Bridge 11), 59 U.S. (18 How.)
(1855).
Id.
See supraPart II.A.
Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421.
Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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river traffic and therefore constituted a public nuisance. 20 9 Congress then
passed a statute that declared the bridge in question to be a "lawful
structur[e]" and "post-roa[d] .,2 0 After a storm destroyed the bridge and the
bridge company rebuilt it, the State of Pennsylvania sought to have the
bridge company held in contempt for violating the 1851 injunction. 21 1 The
case returned to the Supreme Court, and the Court held that the original
injunction was no longer enforceable due to the supervening statute. 212
Unlike a final judgment for money damages, which vests a right to those
damages in the prevailing party that cannot subsequently be diminished by
Congress, a continuing injunction, such as the one entered in 1851, is
predicated on the continuing illegality of the barred conduct. 21 Because
Congress retained the power to modify the underlying law, and used that
power to declare that the bridge was a lawful structure, the injunction was
no longer enforceable. 214
In 2000, the Supreme Court again considered the parameters of
Congress's power to modify the law underlying a federal court's award of
injunctive relief. In the early 1980s, a federal district court found that living
conditions at the Pendleton Correctional Facility violated the Eighth
Amendment and entered an injunction to remedy those constitutional
violations. 2 1 In 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") set a new
standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in prison
conditions cases. 216 The statute provided that a party could move to
terminate an injunction that did not satisfy the new standard, and that such
a motion to terminate would effect an automatic stay of the injunction until
a district judge ruled on the motion to terminate.1 7 The automatic stay

209. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling Bridge 1), 54 U.S. (13 How.)
518, 519 (1851).
210.
Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 429.
211. Id. at 422.
212. Id. at 431-32.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 432. There has been considerable debate concerning whether, after Wheeling
Bridge II, Congress may modify the law underlying final injunctive relief only when that law
involves "public rights" or also when the law involves "private rights." See Brian M. Hoffstadt,
Retaking the Field: The Constitutional Constraints on FederalLegislation that Displaces Consent Decrees,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 53, 73-77 (1999) (surveying cases and commentary in the debate). The scope
of this Article does not require a resolution of that debate.
215. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 331 (2000).
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (2000) ("In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in
which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any
party or intervenor.... ."). The constitutionality of § 3626(b) was not at issue in Miller.See Miller,
530 U.S. at 347 (noting that the Court assumed, "without deciding, that the new standards it
pronounces are effective").
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (2) ("Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief
made under subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during [a limited period] and ... ending on
the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion.").
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provision was written in such a way as to preclude the district court from
exercising its equitable powers to suspend the stay. 218 It did not, however,
purport to overturn the underlying constitutional ruling itself or to
permanently deprive the plaintiffs of a remedy for a proven constitutional
violation; the district court was free to enter a new remedial decree
consistent with the PLRA standard." 9
In Miller v. French, the Supreme Court held that the automatic stay
provision did not violate the separation of powers. The Court rejected the
contention that the automatic stay involved the direct review of a judicial
decision, as in Hayburn's Case,22 1 or constituted a legislative suspension of a
final judgment for money damages, as in Plaut.222 The Miller Court clarified

that "[p]rospective relief under a continuing, executory decree remains
subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law." 223 The automatic
stay does not "suspend" a prior final judgment, but "merely reflects the
changed legal circumstances-that
prospective relief under the existing
24
2

decree is no longer enforceable."

218. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 338 (concluding that, "in the context of § 3626 as a whole[,] ...
Congress intended to prohibit federal courts from" suspending a stay on equitable grounds).
219.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (3) (allowing a district court to enter a new remedial decree
upon finding "that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing
violation of the Federal right, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right, and that the prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to
correct the violation").
220. Miller,530 U.S. at 350.
221. Id. at 343.
222. Id. at 344. Whereas Plaut held that Congress cannot reopen final judgments in suits for
money damages, it explicitly distinguished legislation that "altered the prospective effect of
injunctions entered by Article III courts." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 232
(1995).
223. Miller, 530 U.S. at 344.
224. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court also concluded that the PLRA's automatic stay
provision did not prescribe a rule of decision to a pending case, an act also proscribed by
separation-of-powers principles. Id. That prohibition was articulated in United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). Klein sought to recover the value of property seized by the United
States during the Civil War under a statute that allowed for recovery upon a showing that the
property owner had not given aid or comfort to the Confederacy. Id. at 131. While Klein's case
was pending, Congress passed a statute providing that if the property owner had received a
presidential pardon, the pardon was proof that the property owner had, in fact, aided the
Confederacy. Id. at 134. The statute overruled the Supreme Court's holding in United States v.
Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1869), that as a matter of statutory interpretation,
pardons should be construed as proof that no aid or comfort had been given. In Klein, the
Court held that Congress's intervening statute violated the separation of powers because it
attempted to "prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases
pending before it." Klein, 80 U.S. at 146. The precise scope of Klein has been the topic of
considerable debate. See generally, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal
Protection, the Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory
Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055 (1999); Hoffstadt, supra note 214, at 66-69. But the
Supreme Court has since made it clear that Klein does not prevent Congress from amending
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Justice Souter wrote separately. 225 He agreed with the general
proposition that Congress can "impos[e] new conditions precedent for the
continuing enforcement of existing, prospective remedial orders and
requir[e] courts to apply the new rules to those orders." 226 However, he
dissented from the majority's separation-of-powers discussion. He noted his
concern that the district court might not have sufficient time to make the
findings required for the entry of a new injunction before the old injunction
was extinguished. 2 27 If so, the Pendleton plaintiffs would be left temporarily

without a remedy, despite a judicial finding of a constitutional violation.2 s
In such a case, Justice Souter noted, there would be "a serious question
whether Congress has in practical terms ...

usurp[ed] the judicial function

of determining
•
,,229the applicability of a general rule in particular factual
circumstances.
The majority did not disagree with this perspective, but
deferred:
In this action, we have no occasion to decide whether there could
be a time constraint on judicial action that was so severe that it
implicated these structural separation of powers concerns. The
PLRA does not deprive courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely
provides a new legal standard2 for
relief and encourages courts to
°
apply that standard promptly.

3

The injunction in Miller was similar to the injunctions in Newdow,
Glassroth, and Russelburg in that each was issued upon a federal court's
finding of a federal constitutional violation, not a violation of federal
statutory law or common law as in Wheeling Bridge.231 Of course, Congress is
without power to supersede an Article III court's final interpretation and
application of the Constitution.
However, that is not precisely how the
PLRA or the enforcement-blocking provisions operate-all of these statutes
leave the underlying constitutional ruling intact and instead target the
2 33
remedies available to the plaintiffs.

applicable law. See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429,
441 (1992).
225.
Miller,530 U.S. at 350-53 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226.
Id. at 351.
227. Id. at 351-52.

228.
229.

Id. at 352.
Id.

230.
Miller, 530 U.S. at 350.
231.
Wheeling Bridge II is distinguishable on this basis, and thus its analysis does not squarely
govern the enforcement-blocking provisions passed in response to the constitutional rulings in
Newdow, Glassroth, and Russelburg. See generally Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.
(Wheeling Bridge 11), 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
232. See supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the 'Judicial Power" in Article III).
233. In each situation, Congress left open the possibility of voluntary action by the
defendant to remedy the constitutional violation. However, this does not bring the two

ENFORCEMENT OFFEDERAL COURT ORDERS

1357

At first blush, it might appear that the Court's approval of the PLRA
automatic stay provision places a similar imprimatur on the enforcementblocking provisions. In fact, however, the two provisions operate in quite
different ways and therefore warrant different analyses. Whereas the PLRA
allowed for "promp[t]" entry of a new injunction 234 and therefore imposed
at most a temporary interruption to enforcement of prospective relief, the
enforcement-blocking provisions would permanently bar the enforcement of
a remedy for the underlying constitutional violation. In other words, the
PLRA governed only the scope of the remedy, not its existence.
Enforcement-blocking provisions, by contrast, target the existence of the
remedy and render an enforceable remedy permanently unavailable.
Moreover, they do so by imposing constraints not only on the federal courts,
but also on the executive branch.
These unique characteristics set enforcement-blocking provisions quite
apart from the PLRA automatic stay provision and trigger concerns similar
to those Justice Souter articulated in his separate opinion in Miller.235
Enforcement-blocking provisions are an entirely innovative type of
legislation. Wheeling Bridge II and Miller do not provide the governing
principles. Rather, the principles of finality and executability set forth in
Hayburn's Case, Gordon, and Plaut must inform any analysis of the provisions.
2.

Executive Responses to Final Court Orders

There is no similarly lengthy body of separation-of-powers precedent
articulating the range of appropriate executive responses to final court
orders, although Hayburn's Case made it clear that the Executive cannot
revisit or revise the substance of final court judgments. 236 In addition, there
is a related question whether the Executive either is obligated to enforce
specific court judgments or at least has the discretion to decide whether to
do so, unimpeded by Congress.
There are two possible sources from which one might infer a
constitutional duty of the Executive to enforce specific courtjudgments. The
first possible source is Article II, Section 3's explicit textual command that
the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."2 v The
second possible source is implied from separation-of-powers principles and
from the nature of the Article IIIjudicial power.
If the "laws" referenced in the Take Care Clause include federal court
orders, then it would appear that the President has an explicit constitutional
obligation to enforce such orders and that Congress may not impede the
situations into alignment. The Miller Court did not mention, much less rely on, this possibility
in upholding the automatic stay provision.
234. Miller,530 U.S. at 350.
235. Id. at 351-52 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.t (1792).
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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President in carrying out that duty. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been
vigilant to keep Congress from encroaching on the Executive's lawenforcement power, reiterating that "it is to the President, and not to the
Congress,
that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility" to execute the
8
laws.

23

The Take Care Clause is one of several constitutional mandates directed
at the President.2' 9 As a general matter, the President's obligation to
perform these tasks is not dependent on congressional action; he need not
seek or receive permission to act.24° However, the duty to "take Care that the

Laws be faithfully executed" is unique in the sense that the obligation is
clear but the content is mutable: the substance of the "laws" changes as
Congress acts. 211 Congress, of course, is free to alter or amend the substance

of the "laws" that the Executive is charged with enforcing. However, "once
242
Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its participation ends."
There is an appealing simplicity in the argument that the "laws" the
President is obligated to enforce include the final judgments of the federal
judiciary. The term "laws" certainly can be understood to encompass judicial
decrees. A dictionary contemporaneous with the framing, Samuel Johnson's
Dictionary, defined a "law" as "judicial process," as well as a "decree, edict,
statute, or custom, publickly established as a rule ofjustice."24 s "Decree" was,
in turn, defined as a "determination of a suit, or litigated cause."2 These
definitions have remained stable over time. The current version of the
Oxford English Dictionarydefines "executive" as "the distinctive epithet of that
branch of the government which is concerned or charged with carrying out
the laws, decrees, and judicial sentences."2 45 Indeed, some scholars have
238. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (invalidating the provision of federal election
law that allowed both the President and Congress to appoint members of the Federal Election
Commission ("FEC") because the FEC is an executive agency responsible for enforcing and
monitoring compliance with federal election laws).
239. Other presidential duties include giving periodic State of the Union addresses,
recommending measures to Congress, receiving ambassadors and other public ministers, and
commissioning all of the officers of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. These
"immutable duties" contrast with executive prerogatives, in which the Executive may, but need
not, engage, such as the ability to pardon, make treaties, or prosecute crimes. See LeBoeuf, supra
note 87, at 463 (explaining that Congress cannot use an appropriations rider to expand its

powers).
240. See J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1162, 1183
(considering the relationship between the President's duties and prerogatives and Congress's

appropriations power).
241. See LeBoeuf, supra note 87, at 464 (describing executive duties as well as Congress's
obligation to fund the performance of those duties).
242. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). Of course, the Executive must act in a
manner consistent with congressional intent. See Kendall v. United States ex. rel. Stokes, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524, 524 (1838).
243. 2 SAMUELJOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1785).

244.
245.

1 id.
5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 522 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added).
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asserted that the President's "oath to 'preserve, protect, and defend' the
Constitution," read in conjunction with the Take Care Clause, gives rise to
"an obligation to obey judgments, and where necessary to execute
judgments against other people."246
Alternatively, other scholars argue that the Take Care clause is best read
not to encompass court judgments. Although there is little evidence in the
framing debates about the original meaning and scope of the Take Care
Clause, 47 the term "laws" as used in Article II is best understood to refer to
statutes passed by Congress. Approximately a decade ago, Gary Lawson and
Christopher D. Moore specifically considered this issue and concluded that
the Take Care Clause is not a source of any executive obligation to enforce
court orders. As they point out, the vast majority of constitutional references
to "'law' or 'the laws' . . . clearly mean [] 'statutes"' passed by Congress.248
Even if the Take Care Clause is best read not to address the Executive's
responsibility for enforcing federal court judgments, it might be possible to
infer such an obligation from the constitutional structure. As Lawson and
Moore suggest, there is an "implicit take-care requirement2 49
for judgments
that stems from the Article II and Article III Vesting Clauses."
Several scholars have asserted that the President does, in fact, have a
duty to enforce specific federal court judgments, and that this duty flows in
some way from the nature of the judiciary's Article III powers. The primary
line of reasoning as to why the Executive might be obligated to enforce
specific court judgments piggybacks on the Article III analysis articulated

246. John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the
Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 371, 372 (1988); cf William Baude, TheJudgment Power, 96 GEO.
L.J. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073942 ("The President's
obligation to ensure faithful execution of the law included an obligation to ensure faithful
execution of lawful judgments, because judgments were seen implicitly by nearly everybody to
have a legal status like the laws under which they were issued."); Paulsen, supra note 152, at 277
("If court decisions constitute 'law' binding on the parties (just as statutes are 'laws' of general
applicability), then the branch charged with the faithful execution of those laws is, as Hamilton
recognized in The FederalistNo. 78, the executive branch.").
247. See Richard A. Bales, A ConstitutionalDefense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 381, 409-10
& n.216 ("[R]elatively little is known about the original meaning of the Take Care Clause, and
there similarly are relatively few cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed its breadth.");
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
61-70 (1994) (reviewing the history and structure of the Take Care Clause and noting that "at
the founding, the clause received relatively little consideration by practically everyone in the
debate"). It might be possible to argue that the creation of the U.S. Marshals Service in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, at the same time as the creation of the lower federal courts, suggests that
the first Congress understood that there needed to be an executive mechanism for the
enforcement of court orders.
248. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of ConstitutionalInterpretation,
81 IOwA L. REv. 1267, 1315 & n.225 (1996) (listing nineteen examples, including Article I,
Section 9, Clause 3's prohibition on congressional passage of any ex post facto law).
249. Id. at 1318.
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above: 25 If a proper exercise of the judicial power requires the issuance of a
final, executable judgment, and if the judiciary in fact lacks the means
actually to execute its judgments, then the Executive must step into the
breach and provide the means for the execution of judgments. The same
principles that constrain the legislature from acting to reopen final
judgments impose on the President "an absolute obligation to obey and
enforce judgments
issued by the federal
25 1
finality."

courts. .

.

. Finality means

Some view this obligation as a simple corollary to judicial supremacy: A
federal court's constitutional ruling is "a binding norm that operates at the
level of positive prescription ,252 and "obliges executive officials to comply
with the law as judicially declared." 253 However, even a majority of
departmentalist scholars, who do not subscribe to the idea of judicial
supremacy, agree that the Executive does have some obligation to enforce
judgments, at least insofar as they apply to the parties that were before the
court. For example, as Judge Frank Easterbrook put it, because "a 'judicial
Power' is one to render dispositive judgments[,] ...ajudgment conclusively
resolves the case" and requires enforcement by the executive branch.254
Other scholars have noted that "there is widespread agreement
that the
255
executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments.
Actual practice also lends support for the view that the Executive is
obligated to enforce specific court judgments when called upon. Although
many Presidents have asserted their own interpretive competence in
constitutional matters, they traditionally have complied with and/or
250.
See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing legislative responses to final court orders).
251. Lawson & Moore, supra note 248, at 1319; see also Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism,
Departmentalism, and ProfessorPaulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (1999) ("[Judicial] power...
was ...

a power finally to resolve actual disputes ...

in such a way that there was a substantial

likelihood that a court decision would have some real world effect.").
252. Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality ofSupreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 99899 (1987).
253. Id. at 993.
254. Easterbrook, supra note 140, at 926.
255. Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialOpinions as Binding Law and as ExplanationsforJudgments,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 46 (1993) (stating that this obligation exists "regardless of whether the
executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms the basis for the judgment" (citing
Easterbrook, supra note 140, at 926)); see also Calabresi, supra note 251, at 1427 ("[T]he
President is legally bound to execute federal court judgments . . . . Even Presidents who
ardently subscribed to departmentalism have acknowledged the legally binding force and
obligation to execute a judicial judgment with which they disagreed."); Meese, supra note 152,
at 983 ("[A] constitutional decision by the Supreme Court .. .binds the parties in a case and
also the executive branch for whatever enforcement is necessary."); David A. Strauss, Presidential
Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 121 (1993) (noting the "increasingly
popular" view that "[t]he President must comply with the judgments of the Court in particular
cases" but "the President need go no further in following what the Court says"); cf Devins, supra
note 87, at 475 ("Limitation riders may run afoul of the Constitution if they prohibit the
Executive from implementing final court orders.").
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enforced federal courts' constitutional rulings when called upon. Perhaps
the most obvious example of compliance is President Nixon's prompt
decision to comply with the Supreme Court's order that he turn over his
Watergate tapes.256
Perhaps the most visible example of enforcement of a constitutional
decision to which the Executive was not a party was President Eisenhower's
decision to mobilize the Army's 101st Airborne Division to desegregate
Central High School in Little Rock. 57 In the face of Arkansas Governor
Orval Faubus's decision to deploy the Arkansas National Guard for the
purpose of blocking court-ordered desegregation, President Eisenhower
asked his Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, "for advice as to [his] power
and duty as President to aid in the execution of the court's orders if
obstruction should continue. ,,258 Attorney General Brownell wrote an
extensive opinion, arguing that the President had both the authority and the
obligation to execute the federal court's desegregation order. 259 Brownell
began by noting that the federal court properly had jurisdiction to review
the Governor's action and to order compliance with its own decrees.26°
Citing the Supremacy Clause, Brownell argued that it was the "responsibility
of the national Government, through the Chief Executive, to dispel any such
forcible resistance to Federal law."26 1 Indeed, Brownell noted, "[t]he
Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional power and responsibility
which reposes
in the National Government to compel obedience to law and
26 2
order."
The most notorious and, indeed, the sole example of a presidential
nullification of a court judgment is President Lincoln's defiance of the
mandate in Ex parte Merryman.26' President Lincoln suspended the writ of

256.

See supranote 48 (discussing Nixon's compliance); see also Merrill, supra note 255, at 47

(same).
257.
258.
Federal
259.

260.

See supranote 170 (discussing President Eisenhower's decision).
President's Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement of
Court Orders-Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 322 (1957).
See id. passim.

Id. at 320-21.

261.
Id. at 324.
262. Id. at 326 (citing Ex parteSiebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395 (1879), and statutory authority for
the President to quell civil disturbances).
263. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Other presidents
have asserted their desire and right to defy the Supreme Court by refusing to execute a
judgment, but President Lincoln is the only president actually to do so. See supra note 57
(noting President Andrew Jackson's response to Worcester v. Georgia); see also Paulsen, supra note
152, at 259 & n.159 (discussing President Jackson's veto of the bill rechartering the Bank of the
United States and noting that he was not in fact defying or refusing to enforce the Court's
judgment in McCulloch v. Maryland); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11,
1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 50-51 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., 1905) (explaining his decision to exercise the presidential pardon power on behalf
of those convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798-even though the federal courts had upheld

1362

93 IOWA LA WRE VIEW

[20081

habeas corpus on April, 27, 1861.2 4 Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger
Taney then ruled that President Lincoln lacked power to suspend the writ
and that John Merryman, a suspected secessionist who had been detained,
was "entitled to be set at liberty and discharged immediately from
imprisonment. "26 Chief Justice Taney addressed President Lincoln directly
in the opinion:
[H]e is to take care that [the laws] be faithfully carried into
execution, as they are expounded and adjudged by the co-ordinate
branch of the government to which that duty is assigned by the
constitution. It is thus made his duty to come in aid of the judicial
authority... ; but in exercising this power he acts in subordination
to judicial authority, assisting it to execute its process and enforce
2
its judgments. 6
Thus, in Taney's understanding, the President's obligation to execute the
laws extended to the execution ofjudicial decrees.
President Lincoln, however, continued to hold Merryman in custody
and, in an address to Congress on July 4, 1861, defended the propriety of
that decision, and of his initial suspension of the writ, on the merits. 267 The
next day, his Attorney General, Edward Bates, issued an opinion articulating
the legal basis for the President's noncompliance. 2m Bates emphasized the
"co-ordinate and coequal" status of the branches of the federal government
and asserted that "the system of checks and balances" and "mutual
antagonism" would be sufficient to keep the coequal and independent
branches "within their proper spheres." 269 He concluded that the executive
branch was not bound by the judgments and orders of the judiciary: "If it be
true... that the President and the judiciary are co-ordinate departments of
government, and the one not subordinate to the other, I do not understand
how it can be legally possible for a judge to issue a command to the
President....70 Most scholars agree that President Lincoln and Attorney
General Bates took the principle of coordinacy too far and that the

the Act's constitutionality-and writing that "nothing in the Constitution has given [the judges]
a right to decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them").
264. See Paulsen, supranote 162, at 90.
265. Mernyman, 17 F. Cas. at 147.
266. Id. at 149.
267. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), reprinted in 4
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).

268.

100p.Att'yGen.74 (1861).

269.

Id. at 76-77; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 281-82 (James Madison) (Clinton

Rossiter ed., 1999) (asserting coordinacy of branches); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 288-89
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (stating that checks and balances will keep each
branch in its proper place).
270. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. at 85.
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Executive, in fact, is not permitted to disregard or refuse to enforce specific
court judgments. Indeed, Meryman is regarded as an aberration.27 '
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, however, regards Merryman as a
singularly principled stand that proves that the Executive is, in fact, not
constitutionally obligated to abide by or to enforce court judgments.
Starting from the departmentalist premise that each coordinate branch "has
completely independent interpretive authority within the sphere of its
powers," 2 72 Professor Paulsen argues that, just as the President and Congress
cannot dictate the resolution of federal court cases, the federal courts
cannot dictate to the President "how, when, and whether to execute
judgments. "27 Rather, the "President has independent constitutional power
to decline to enforce judgments that rest on an incorrect interpretation of
constitutional, statutory, or treaty law." 274 Professor Paulsen notes the
untenable consequences (in his view) of an alternative approach:
If the judiciary could, in effect, instruct the executive as to how to
enforce the law, and the executive were bound to enforce
judgments no matter how clearly they violated the Constitution,
then the judiciary would not be weak (as Hamilton claimed [in
FederalistNo. 78] ), but very, very powerful. Its judgments.., would
be beyond any check.7 7
Professor Paulsen, though, stands alone on the question of the Executive's
enforcement obligations. As noted above, some have posited that the
Executive has an absolute duty to enforce final court judgments, at least as
to the parties before the court. 6 Others who have examined this issue have
attempted to chart a middle ground between the two extremes.

271.

See Merrill, supra note 255, at 47 (citing JESSE H.

CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE

NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME

COURT 140-50 (1980)); cf Baude, supra note 246, at 61-66 (positing that Lincoln and Bates did
not claim the executive power to ignore judgments entered by courts of competent jurisdiction,
but rather may have disregarded Taney's order because Taney lacked the jurisdiction to issue
the writ (citing DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 190-91 (2003)).
272. Paulsen, supra note 162, at 85; see supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text; see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 282 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) ("The several
departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of
them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries
between their respective powers.").
273. Lawson & Moore, supra note 248, at 1323 (summarizing Paulsen's thesis).
274. Paulsen, supra note 152, at 276; see also Paulsen, supra note 162, at 84 (stating that
"there is no such thing as judicial supremacy: the President has legitimate constitutional
authority to disregard any judicial decree or precedent he chooses"); id. at 109 ("[The
President] may decline to enforce . . . even specific judgments between private parties
whenever, in his independent legal judgment, the court's ruling is incorrect ... The decisions
of courts, in any matter requiring executive enforcement, are entitled to such persuasive weight
only as the President may think them worth.").
275. Paulsen, supranote 152, at 252.
276. See supra notes 246, 251-55 and accompanying text.
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Lawson and Moore reject both the position that the Executive is bound
to enforce every final court judgment and the position that the Executive
has no duty whatsoever in this regard. Rather, they suggest that final court
orders generally give rise to an enforcement obligation, except in one rare
case: "[T] he President and Congress can refuse to enforce a judgment only
in extreme circumstances: only for constitutional error, and only when that
error is 'so clear that it is not open to rational question.''" Steven Calabresi
has seconded this "clear mistake" approach, 278 arguing that it is consistent
with the nature of the Article III judicial power, historical practice, and
sound policy. 279 In the most recent thinking on this issue, William Baude has

offered an even more limited exception to the rule that judgments of Article
III courts "must be enforced by the executive branch so long as those courts
S
have jurisdiction over the case": 2"
The Executive may refuse to enforce only
judgments rendered without jurisdiction. 8 '
Enforcement-blocking provisions prevent the executive branch from
enforcing specific final orders of the federal courts. Thus, such provisions
certainly appear problematic from the point of view of those who would
impose an absolute or near-absolute enforcement obligation on the
executive branch. Indeed, they appear problematic even for those who
adhere to the Paulsen point of view. Paulsen's conclusion that the Executive
is not obligated to enforce court orders does not preclude the Executive
from deciding, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to enforce such
orders. Indeed, in light of Paulsen's emphasis on preserving the Executive's
independent judgment on constitutional matters, it would seem that his
argument places squarely in the Executive's hands the prerogative to
execute court orders. Thus, even from Paulsen's perspective, congressional
attempts to block the Executive from enforcing final court orders are still
potentially quite problematic because they bar members of the executive
branch from exercising their independent judgment to act in coordination
with another branch of the federal government.
IV. ENFORCEMENT-BLOCKING PROVISIONS: SEPARATION-OF-POWERS
ANALYSIS AND CONCERNS

The enforcement-blocking provisions passed in response to Newdow,
Glassroth, and Russelburg were clearly motivated by the House of
Representatives' disapproval of the substance of those rulings and are

277. Lawson & Moore, supra note 248, at 1325-26 (citation omitted).
278. Calabresi, supra note 251, at 1425 & n.17.
279.
See id. at 1425-31.
280. See Baude, supra note 246, at 5. Baude contends that the original understanding of the
Article III judicial power, in conjunction with the common law of judgments, indicates that a
federal court's resolution of any "case" or "controvers[y]" within its jurisdiction is necessarily
binding on all, including the Executive. See id. at 12-37.
281.
See id. at 32-33.
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unvarnished attempts to sap those rulings of any strength. However, the
enforcement-blocking provisions are quite innovative. To accomplish their
ultimate goal, they use Congress's appropriations power to block executive
action and do not directly touch the court judgments themselves. These
provisions lack a historical analogue, and therefore it is a challenge to
analyze them within the traditional separation-of-powers framework.
The provisions are distinct from congressional acts the Supreme Court
considered in prior separation-of-powers decisions. The provisions do not
prescribe rules of decision for the courts. While they indicate Congress's
disagreement with a court's constitutional rulings, they do not-at least as a
technical matter-make Congress an appellate reviewer of a court's decision
or even require a court to reopen its final judgment vis-A-vis the parties to
the case. But they do undermine the power of a final judgment and
compromise its executability. Unless the parties voluntarily comply with the
judgment, the court (and the prevailing party) is without recourse and may
not enlist the executive branch in enforcement efforts. Thus, other than its
persuasive or hortatory value, the judgment lacks any real ability to change
It is only a small
the legal positions of the parties in relation to each other.
82
step removed from an unconstitutional advisory opinion.2
Despite the unique characteristics of enforcement-blocking provisions
and the lack of a case directly on point, it seems clear that the provisions
tread perilously close to the heart of Article III power and raise many of the
concerns
that have
motivated the Court's separation-of-powers
jurisprudence.113 A fair reading of Plaut-which vindicated the finality of
court judgments even in non-constitutional cases-in conjunction with City
of Boerne and Cooper-which vindicated the supremacy and finality of
constitutional rulings by the judicial department-strongly suggests that a
provision that seeks to bar permanently the enforcement of an injunction
based on a constitutional ruling encroaches on the judiciary's Article III
power and thus runs afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Indeed,
in some ways, the enforcement-blocking provisions seem at least as
problematic as other provisions the Court has considered, if not moreso:
They target constitutional, rather than statutory, decisions of the federal
courts-a difference that implicates judicial review and supremacy in a way
that has not heretofore been considered.
However, while enforcement-blocking provisions leave open the
possibility of parties' voluntary compliance with court judgments, they
completely foreclose the possibility of executive action to enforce a court
judgment. If the executive branch is constitutionally obligated to enforce
282. See supra Part III.B.1.
283. Cf Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225 (1995) ("Our decisions stemming
from Hayburn's Case-although their precise holdings are not strictly applicable here-have
uniformly provided fair warning that such an act exceeds the powers of Congress." (internal
citations omitted)).
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final court orders, 2 14 then the enforcement-blocking provisions constitute an
even clearer assault on the executive branch than on the judiciary. Whether
28 5
one locates the source of this executive obligation in the Take Care Clause
or derives it from the nature of the Article III judicial power,286 the
enforcement-blocking
provisions both contravene textual delegations of
287
power
and "preven[t] the Executive
Branch from accomplishing its
288
constitutionally assigned functions."
Even if the executive branch has no obligation to enforce court
judgments but does have the prerogative to determine independently
whether or not to do so, enforcement-blocking provisions still raise potential
separation-of-powers concerns. The Russelburg case highlights the problem.
In that case, the executive branch declared its intention to enforce the
court's final order.289 By seeking to block the Executive from taking any
action in this regard, Congress asserted the power to trump an executive lawenforcement initiative undertaken in support of a decision of a federal
court. From a functional separation-of-powers perspective, Congress, by
selectively de-funding the Executive's ability to undertake a single lawenforcement initiative, has so exceeded its policymaking and oversight roles
as to encroach on the core executive function. 290
At bottom, by passing the enforcement-blocking provisions, the House
of Representatives has asserted its own autonomy in matters of constitutional
interpretation. However, enforcement-blocking provisions appear to take
the departmentalist postulate of coordinacy 291 to its logical breaking point.
They not only assume that Congress's independence and competence to
interpret the Constitution is coextensive with that of the President and the
courts; they also assert that when Congress disagrees with the constitutional
ruling of a federal court and with the Executive's independent decision to
enforce that ruling, Congress may use its appropriations power to block the
other branches' cooperative efforts and to vindicate its own substantive
reading of the Constitution. Because the power of the purse resides with
Congress, Congress would always have the last word in the resolution of
constitutional controversies. Whatever concerns one might have with giving
284. See supra Part III.C.2.
285. See supra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
286.
See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
287.
Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705-11 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying a
formalist separation-of-powers inquiry to independent-counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
288. Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
289. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. It is not clear whether this decision to
enforce Russelburg is predicated on substantive agreement with the order or on a prudential
decision to enforce despite substantive disagreement.
290. Cf Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) ("[T]he Constitution prohibits one
branch from encroaching on the central prerogatives of another.").
291.
See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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unchecked power to the federal judiciary, this view of coordinacy will give
dangerous amounts of unchecked power to the legislative branch.
V.

CONCLUSION

During his confirmation hearing, Justice Alito wisely deferred on
assessing the constitutionality of recent enforcement-blocking provisions
passed by the House of Representatives. 9 3 Such provisions are innovative,
potentially powerful, and almost certainly unconstitutional responses to
controversial federal court decisions. Congress's appropriations power,
although broad, cannot be exercised in contravention of the separation of
powers.29 4 Enforcement-blocking provisions come close to undermining the
finality and executability of federal court judgments, in violation of the core
power conveyed to the judiciary by Article III. 9 5 Even more critically, the
provisions impede the executive branch in the execution of its constitutional
responsibility to enforce final court orders, or at least its constitutional
prerogative to choose to enforce such orders. 2916 Whatever one's view of
judicial supremacy or departmentalist theory, it seems fair to say that, in
order to preserve the essence and structural integrity of each of the three
branches of our federal government, Congress should be barred from
selectively de-funding the enforcement of final court orders even if it
substantively disapproves of the underlying court judgment.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See Paulsen, supra note 152, at 252.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.2.
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